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FRONT-END LOADED, Two-TIERED
TENDER OFFERS: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE EFFECTS OF
A MIGHTY OFFENSIVE WEAPON
Robert A. Prentice*
In the 1980s, front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers
emerged as one of the most potent weapons in the takeover
game. This Article describes the development of the front-end
loaded, two-tiered offer, its impact on state and federal law,
and the reasons for its decline. The author argues that the per-
ceived coerciveness and unfairness of front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers created a negative backlash that was out of
proportion to the true provocation.
TAKEOVERS CONTINUE to restructure the United States'
economy.1 Like busybodies with a juicy new neighborhood
scandal, legal scholars have examined this phenomenon from
every conceivable angle, comparing offensive and defensive take-
over tactics with the moves in a chess match2 or the battles in a
* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Texas at Austin; B.A., Univer-
sity of Kansas (1972); J.D., Washburn University (1975).
1. Although "Black Monday" slowed the takeover pace briefly in late 1987, merger
and acquisition activity, much of it in the form of hostile tender offers, has increased rap-
idly since then. See generally Smith, Merger Boom Defies Expectations, Wall St. J., Jan.
3, 1989, at 8R, col. I (despite "fear about the economy's reaction to the stock market
crash, 1988 unexpectedly became a boom year for deals"); Celis, Low Stock Prices Spur
Takeover Flurry: Activity for Day Totals Over $5 Billion, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 3,
col. I ("for the foreseeable future, takeover specialists say, the climate remains ripe for
acquisition"); Sease, Takeover Wars, Economic Trends Combine to Push Equities Higher,
Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1988, at 43, col. 3 ("takeover business seems to be back in vogue");
Burrough, Companies Take Over The Takeover Game From Flashy Raiders, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 6 ("U.S. companies are staging a comeback on the takeover
scene.").
2. See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mo-
bilized to Overcome the Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337 (1983).
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war.3 These analogies are good ones; however, one contrast stands
out. Whereas the rules of chess have not changed for centuries,4
the rules governing tender offers are constantly evolving. And
whereas the rules for warfare are observed mainly in the breach,5
the tactics of tender offerors and targets are constantly evolving in
order to conform to changing state and federal legislative and ad-
ministrative rules.
Perhaps a better analogy is one to sports. Offensive and de-
fensive tactics form the core of these games, and in many sports
the rules are constantly changing. For example, the 1988 major
league baseball season began with a rhubarb over the impact of
new rules on the size of the strike zone and the definition of a
balk.' In sports, as in tender offers, contestants are always search-
ing for an edge - a tactic or maneuver to ensure victory. Since
the fun is eliminated from sports if one side has a sure victory, the
rules are often changed to compensate for a "super weapon."
When George Mikan became the National Basketball Associa-
tion's first true big man, the three-second lane was widened to
hinder his play.' When Bill Russell emerged in college as the
greatest defensive player the game had ever known, goal tending
was prohibited.8 And when Lew Alcindor (Kareem Abdul Jabbar)
dominated the college ranks, the dunk shot was banned for nine
years.'
3. This accounts for the origin of terms such as "pearl harbor file" (a target com-
pany's compilation of contingency plans to be used in the event of a surprise hostile take-
over attempt) and "white knight" (a friendly bidder willing to "rescue" a target corpora-
tion from a hostile bidder). See J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 166-68 (1987).
Brooks even applied the military analogy to this Article's primary subject: "The two-
tier tender offer, in which some of the target company's stockholders are treated markedly
differently than others as a measure of dividing to conquer, calls to mind the similar policy
of many military aggressor nations toward their victims." Id. at 167.
4. The current rules have been in place for at least two centuries, and perhaps for
more than four. A. HOROWITZ, THE WORLD CHESS CHAMPIONSHIP 1 (1973); H.
SHONBERG, GRANDMASTERS OF CHESS 18 (1973).
5. For example, although numerous treaties and conventions have outlawed the use
of poisonous gas in warfare, its use continues. See G. VON GLAHN. LAW AMONG NATIONS
588-90 (2d ed. 1970). See also Iranians Say Iraqis Killed 10 in Poison Gas Raid on
Town, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1987, at A6, col. I (U.N. team recently declared Iraq had
used chemical weapons).
6. Wulf, A Squawk About Balks, SPORTS ILLUS., May 2, 1988, at 98; Gammons,
Inside Baseball, SPORTS ILLUS., Apr. 4, 1988, at 104.
7. The Making of a Legend: Towering Lew Alcindor, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 27, 1967, at
60.
8. Id.
9. Klein, High on the Slam Dunk, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 22, col. 1.
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It was a super offensive weapon, the "Saturday Night Spe-
cial," that helped prompt the initial state and federal regulation of
tender offers. When the conglomerate merger wave swept across
corporate America in the 1960s, tender offers became the mecha-
nism of choice for effecting takeovers. The "Saturday Night Spe-
cial"10 helped ensure the success of a hostile bid. The offer was
typically announced on a Friday afternoon, giving target share-
holders only a week to ten days to decide whether to tender their
shares. The timing of the announcement prevented any effective
response from target management until the following Monday,
when part of the offering period had already expired. Target
shareholders, who were often given little or no information about
the offeror or its financing, made their decisions on the basis of
inadequate information. They had little choice, however, since a
gun was at their collective head.
The patent unfairness of this situation spawned the first
tender offer legislation. First Virginia,"1 then the federal govern-
ment through the Williams Act,12 and finally many other states13
enacted tender offer regulations. The Williams Act, which focused
federal regulation on disclosure, also contained procedural and
substantive provisions for shareholder protection, including with-
drawal rights and pro rata purchases for oversubscribed offers.1 4
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supplemented
these provisions with various rules, which strengthened or modi-
fied the Williams Act's provisions so that shareholders would have
at least twenty business days to consider an offer. 5
Then tender offer strategists, eager to put the pressure back
on shareholders, invented a new device which is the subject of this
Article - the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer. This offer
Another comparison between sports and tender offer battles that comes immediately to
mind is the overcompensation of the gladiators. In the recent 11-week battle between
Campeau and Macy for control of Federated Department Stores, Inc., it has been reported
that lawyers for the various contestants "earned" $40 million. Investment bankers did even
better, receiving $200 million for their trouble. See Jensen & Sontag, Lawyers in Feder-
ated Takeover Hit Paydirt, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
10. See generally Steinberger, Corporate Takeovers-Cash Tender Offers, Ex-
change Offers, and Target Defense, in I BUSINESS AcQuIsiONs 604 (2d ed. 1981).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1986).
13. See Note, The Tender Offer Regulation Battle Continues: Should States Regu-
late Only Local Companies, 60 IND. U. 721, 724 n.38 (1985).
14. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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"typically [consists of] a cash offer that produces control, followed
by acquisition of the remaining equity [through a merger] at a
lower price for debt or equity securities of the acquiring com-
pany." 6 Proponents thought the front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer would be to takeovers what the forward pass was to
Notre Dame football in the days of Knute Rockne.17 Critics, on
the other hand, perceived it to be as coercive and unfair as the
"Saturday Night Special."'
After sketching the history of the front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer, this Article will demonstrate how the percep-
tion of unfairness and coercion surrounding these offers had an
impact on every phase of the tender offer game. In response to the
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer, the SEC adopted more
stringent rules governing offensive tactics in tender offers, 19 target
corporations and potential target corporations devised more radi-
cal defensive tactics, 20 state courts reviewing defensive tactics
gave target management more leeway in preventing two-tiered of-
fers, 2' and state legislatures adopted a wide variety of target-ori-
ented takeover regulations, which have been validated by the Su-
preme Court.2 To add insult to injury, front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers became a standard defensive tactic for target
corporations.23
This Article will assess the true merits of such offers. It will
ask whether front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers are truly
coercive and unfair, whether the changes their existence has
wrought have been justified, and whether some of the changes
should be reversed. 4
16. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 499 (2d ed. 1988).
17. E.g., Lederman, Tender Offer Bidding Strategy, 17 REV. SEc. REG. 917 (1984);
Lederman & Vlahakis, Pricing and Proration in Tender Offers, 14 REV. SEc. REG. 813,
819 (1981). See also Balotti & Finkelstein, "Coercive" Structures in Tender Offers, 15
REV. SEC. REG. 820 (1982).
18. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 98, 105, 109, 113-14 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 155-94 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 197-254 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 300-65 and accompanying text.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF FRONT-END LOADED, Two-TIERED
TENDER OFFERS
Although neither Congress nor the SEC has ever defined the
term,2 5 a "tender offer may be generally defined as: a public offer
or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons
to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class
or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified
price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities."26 The
offer may be approved by the target's board of directors (a
"friendly offer") or it may be a self-tender offer made by the tar-
get itself. Often, however, it will be a hostile tender offer launched
by a third-party and opposed by target management. The hostile
offer spawns the most heated litigation and creates the most inter-
esting legal questions.
Target corporations have developed various defensive tactics
which prevent the hostile bidder from succeeding, or at the very
least, make the bidder pay dearly for success. These colorfully
named defensive tactics include: "Shark Repellents," "Golden
Parachutes," "Cyanide Capsules," "Poison Pills," "Lock-up Op-
tions," sales of "Crown Jewels," "White Knights," "Pac-Man"
counter-offers, and even "Corporate Suicide. 27 A hostile bidder,
25. In the absence of Congressional or SEC definition, most courts have adopted the
eight-factor test enunciated in Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
a ffd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. 460 U.S. 1069
(1983). See Andre, Unconventional Offers Under the Williams Act: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, II J. CORP. L. 499, 541-63 (1986); Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the
Williams Act, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 189 (1987). The eight factor test suggested by the
commission included:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an
issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3)
offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms
of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of
a fixed number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7)
offeree subject to pressure to sell his stock; and (8) public announcement of a
purchasing program concerning the target company precede or accompany rapid
accumulation of large amounts of the target company's securities.
Id. at 203.
26. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70
(1973). Although the tender offeror's goal is almost always to gain 100% of the target's
shares, an acquisition is typically structured as an initial purchase of fewer than 5 % of the
target's shares, followed by a tender offer to increase holdings to over 50%, positioning the
acquirer for a squeeze- out merger to acquire the remainder. See Freund & Easton, The
Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34
Bus. LAW. 1679, 1683-85 (1979).
27. These terms, and those listed in the next paragraph, will be defined in context as
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who faces this array of defenses, as well as federal regulation
under the Williams Act and state takeover laws (which can be
more accurately described as "anti-takeover laws"), needs a few
arrows in its own quiver. Ingenious corporate attorneys and invest-
ment bankers have risen to the occasion, creating offensive tactics
such as "Greenmail," 2 "Bootstrap Offers," "Group Bids," "Bust-
up Takeovers," and "Junk Bonds." The most controversial weapon
of the corporate arms race, however, is the front-end loaded, two-
tiered offer.
In 1980,29 front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers evolved
out of the need to counter these potent defensive tactics in a cruci-
ble of regulation formed by the Williams Act and its attendant
SEC rules. The Williams Act was primarily disclosure-oriented, 0
and the SEC rules required that a tender offer be kept open for at
least twenty business days in order to give shareholders an ade-
quate opportunity to study these disclosures.31 The Williams Act
also addressed the consequences of a partial offer that attracted
more tendered shares than the offeror wished to purchase. In this
situation, the offeror was required to purchase shares on a pro
rata basis from all those who tendered them within ten calendar
days after the offer began.32
If the bidder made an "any and all" offer, agreeing to
purchase as many shares as were tendered from one percent to
100 %, the pro rata purchasing requirement was irrelevant. Many
tender offers, however, were "partial" offers. The bidder generally
sought fifty-one percent or more of the target's shares. In a partial
offer, there was an incentive for the target shareholder to act
quickly and tender his shares within the first ten days in order to
capture the tender offer premium33 for at least a percentage of his
they arise during the article. See R. PRENTICE, LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION 715-34 (1987); Comment, A Review of the Literature on Defen-
sive Tactics to Surprise Cash Tender Offers, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 909 (1980).
28. For a discussion of "greenmail," see Booth, The Promise of State Takeover
Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1635, 1662-63 (1988).
29. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) & 78n(d) (1986) (originally enacted as Act of July 29,
1968, §§ 13(d) & 14(d), 82 Stat. 454, 454-56 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1988).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1986).
33. Premiums over market price tend to vary over the years. Although most studies
indicate lower numbers, one study of offers over a four-week period in the late 1970s found
the average hostile tender offer premium to be 72%. Chatlos, The SEC v. Investors on
Tender Offers, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 6-7. Professor Lowenstein stated that
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holdings. Tendering within the ten day proration period assured
some profits to the prompt target shareholder. The bidder, who
made a partial offer, might have been satisfied with the purchase
of only a portion of the target's shares, but in most cases the par-
tial bidder's ultimate goal was similar to that of the "any and all"
bidder - to own 100% of the target. Indeed, from 1981 to 1983
the goal of eighty percent of all tender offers was the acquisition
of the entire equity interest of the target.34
To gain 100% control, partial bidders usually followed the
tender offer with a freeze-out merger. If the target shareholder
could be assured of receiving the same value for his shares in the
first-step tender offer and second-step merger, then there would be
little pressure to tender, unless the target shareholder favored the
tender offer price and was concerned that not enough shares
would be tendered to reach the bidder's minimum.35 If the merger
price was less than the tender offer price, however, the bid was
called a front-end loaded, two-tiered offer. The impact of this tac-
tic was implicit. The bidder did not need to announce the inten-
tion to pay less in the second stage of the takeover. The mere
possibility of such an intention encouraged alert shareholder's to
rush into the proration pool. However, for maximum effect, why
not make the front-end loaded, two-tiered bid explicit? Why not
announce in advance that the second-stage merger price would be
lower than the first-stage tender offer price, putting maximum
pressure on the target shareholders?
The unfairness and coercive impact of an explicit front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offer seem apparent. Although this con-
clusion may not survive close scrutiny, at first blush it is difficult
to escape. As one commentator noted:
From the bidder's point of view, a two-tiered pricing structure
has the advantage of ensuring a high percentage of tenders dur-
ing the proration period, since the target shareholders know (or
should know) that if they do not tender within the proration pe-
in the late 1980s the average premium in successful hostile tender offers is 80%. Lowen-
stein, Letter to the Editor, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 177, 178. The size of premiums
varies with the type of offer. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
34. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 153, 162 n.35 (1986). Another study indicates that takeout mergers follow successful
tender offers within five years in 72% of the cases. Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and
Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 352 n.2 (1977).
35. See SEC, Office of the Chief Economist, The Economics of Partial and Two-Tier
Tender Offers, 49 Fed. Reg. 26, 755 (1984) [hereinafter Office of the Chief Economist].
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riod they will almost inevitably be relegated to the "low back
end" of the second step merger. Coupled with a ten calendar
day proration period (the shortest possible under Section
14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act), the two-tiered pricing structure
can, and is intended to, create an atmosphere of stampede
among the target company's shareholders.
In addition to forcing target shareholders to act quickly, an-
other, perhaps more important, purpose of the two-tiered pricing
structure is to shorten the timetable for, and increase the odds
against, a competing tender offer. It is, in short, an attempt to
return to the psychology, and as much of the actuality as possi-
ble, of the fabled "Saturday Night Special" of bygone
days-the ten calendar-day blitzkrieg approach to tender
offers.36
Although one should not prejudge an issue that will be ex-
amined in detail later in this Article, the front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer appears to be extremely persuasive. The share-
holder finds himself in a quandary known as the "prisoner's di-
lemma."3 7 He may believe that the tender offer price for fifty-one
percent of his company's stock is too low and wish to hold out for
a higher bid. Because of the threat that other shareholders will
tender their shares and ensure the offer's success, however, the
shareholder is coerced into tendering,€so that at least fifty-one per-
cent of his shares will be purchased at the higher tender offer
price. Failure to tender initially may mean that all of his shares
will be purchased at the lower price of the second-stage merger.
Thus, the front-end loaded, two-tiered offer may induce all share-
holders to tender, even though no one thinks the offer adequate.
As takeover specialist Martin Lipton has observed:
The difference in the prices of the tiers unfairly pressures the
target shareholder. A shareholder who would prefer that the tar-
36. Nathan, Novel Legal Questions Explored, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 25, col.
6 & at 31, col. 1.
37. In the classic "prisoner's dilemma," a game invented to illustrate the problems
arising from the inability to coordinate decisions in order to gain optimal results, X and Y
are arrested for a crime. The prosecutor separates them so that they cannot coordinate
their responses. He tells each that he has enough evidence to send them to jail for one year.
However, the prosecutor tells X that if he alone confesses, he will be given three months in
jail and his partner ten years, and that Y is being offered the same deal. If both confess,
they will each be given five years. The prosecutor makes the same proposition to Y. The
optimal result is for neither to confess. However, because X cannot count on Y to refuse to
confess, and vice versa, both will protect themselves by confessing. See generally A. RAPO-
PORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER's DILEMMA (1965); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 504-05
(9th ed. 1973).
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get remain independent will usually tender anyway out of fear
that a majority of her fellow shareholders will tender, leaving
her squeezed out of her investment at the lower second-tier
price."
Credit for the innovative front-end loaded, two-tiered strategy
is frequently given to Bruce Wasserstein, formerly of the First
Boston investment banking house.39 McDermott Corporation's
fifty-four dollar/front-end, thirty-nine dollar/back-end bid for
Pullman, Inc. in 1980 has been cited as the first use of the de-
vice.40 Twenty percent of the tender offers in 1982 and 1983 were
front-end loaded, two-tiered offers,41 including several "mega-
deals" such as Martin-Marietta's "Pac-Man" counter tender offer
for Bendix Corporation,42 DuPont's bid for Conoco, 43 Whittaker's
bid for Brunswick," and U.S. Steel's "white knight" bid, which
snatched Marathon Oil Co. away from Mobil Corporation.4 5
From 1980 to 1982, the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offer became very popular very quickly. The reasons are easy to
discern. In theory, the offer prompts early tendering by otherwise
reluctant shareholders.46 It also reduces the overall cost of an ac-
38. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1987).
39. Metz, How First Boston Corp. Turned Itself Around Amid a Merger Mania,
Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
40. McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 649 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980). Mc-
Dermott's bid for Pullman, Inc. was worth $54/share for 54% of Pullman on the front-
end, but contemplated a back-end merger at only $39/share. The bid was unsuccessful,
losing to a rival offer by Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., which, although not front-end loaded,
carried a higher overall value of $594 million versus $525 million for the McDermott bid.
See Wheelabrator Wins the Battle for Pullman, Inc., Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 7, col.
2; McDermott, Inc. Extends Bid for Pullman As Court Ordered: Wheelabrator Appeals,
Wall. St. J., Sept. 23, 1980, at 4, col. 1. Fogelson and Kapp suggest that the McDermott
bid may have lost simply because of its novelty. Fogelson & Kapp, The Emergence of
Proration Pools and Two-Tier Offers as Desired Structures for Acquisitions, in FOUR-
TEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 581, 624 (1982).
41. Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now a Defensive Technique, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9,
1987, at 26, col. 4.
42. P. HARTZ, MERGER 80-86 (1985).
43. Dallas Morning News, July 30, 1981, at 8D (advertisement by rival bidder,
Seagram's).
44. Brunswick Corp., Whittaker Each Win A Round in Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 26,
1982, at 18, col. 3.
45. Nag & Rotbart, U.S. Steel Moves to Rescue Marathon Oil From Mobil: Bid
May Just Be Opener of Far Wider Takeover Battle, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1981, at 3, col.
1. For a description of several other early front-end loaded, two-tiered offers, see, Fogelson
& Kapp, supra note 40, at 613-21.
46. Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?,
19 GA. L. REV. 281, 320 (1985); Note, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application
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quisition4 7 which allows smaller bidders to stalk larger targets. 8
Also, it arguably allows a lesser bid. For example, an offer of $100
per share for 50% of the target stock in the front-tier and of $50
per share for the other 50 % in the back-end merger is capable of
defeating an offer of $80 per share for 100% of the stock, even
though the front-end loaded, two-tiered offer only has a total
blended value of $75 per share to defeat a higher "any and all"
bid. Since a target shareholder will fear being forced to accept the
$50 per share back-end merger offer, because he does not know
how many of his fellow shareholders will accept the front-tier of-
fer, he may succumb to the pressure to get as high a percentage of
the $100 per share offer as possible. 9
One other advantage of the two-tiered offer is demonstrated
by the following hypothetical. A hostile bidder makes a tender of-
fer for 50% of a target's stock at $100 per share with a promised
second-step merger price for the other 50% at $60 per share. On
the sixteenth business day of the "hold-open" period, a white
knight makes a competing "any and all" offer at $85 per share.
To ensure victory, the hostile bidder may wish to increase the
blended value of its bid from its current level of $80 per share.
The hostile bidder, however, also wants to maintain its timing ad-
vantage over the white knight, since the ability to purchase first in
this situation is very important. A new bid would start the twenty-
day "hold-open" period running all over again. Furthermore, rais-
ing the price of the tender offer on the front-end (for example,
from $100 per share to $120 per share in order to raise the
blended price to $90 per share), would trigger SEC Rule 14e-
l(b). In 1980, this rule required that a bid be held open for an
additional ten days following any price increase.50 An increase in
the number of shares sought in the tender offer, however, did not
trigger the extra ten-day hold-open period. Therefore, the hostile
bidder could raise the blended price of its bid to $90 per share, by
increasing the percentage of shares to be acquired in the front-end
of Federal and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA.
L. REv. 389, 389 (1982).
47. Coffee, Regulating The Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1281 (1984);
Dennis, supra note 46, at 320; Note, supra note 46, at 389.
48. Neff, Takeover Responses-an Update, CONFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 24 (Univ. of Tex. School of Law 1986).
49. Lederman, supra note 17, at 917.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b) (1980).
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from 50% to 75 %, without losing the timing advantage. Using
this technique, Esmark defeated a rival bid by Anderson, Clayton
& Co. in a battle for control of Norton Simon. 1
A. Challenges Under Federal Law
Although many commentators thought that such a powerful
and apparently coercive device must have legal flaws, the front-
end loaded, two-tiered tender offer initially survived all legal as-
saults on its validity.52 The front-end loaded, two-tiered offer
seemed to easily comply with the disclosure provisions of the Wil-
liams Act. Section 14(d) 51 of the Securities Exchange Act re-
quires a bidder to file a Schedule 14D-1 54 as soon as possible on
the date a tender offer begins. Schedule 14D-1 requires disclosure
of any subsequent merger plans of the bidder. These requirements
pose no problem for the bidder in a front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer, because disclosure is desired. The bidder wishes to
disclose and even flaunt the lower merger price to maximize the
coercive impact of the bid.55 The same reasoning eliminates any
misstatement or omission problem under Section 14(e),56 which
provides a remedy for violation of any of the disclosure provisions
and for any other misrepresentation that occurs during the course
of a tender offer.
Section 14(e), however, also bans use of "manipulative acts
or practices" in connection with a tender offer. The first major
legal assault on front-end loaded, two-tiered offers alleged that
they were "manipulative" in violation of Section 14(e). This ap-
peared to be a sensible approach in light of the Sixth Circuit's
1981 decision in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. 57 The court
held that the lock-up options58 Marathon had granted to white
51. See Morris & Metz, Esmark Offers to Buy All Shares of Norton Simon, Wall
St. J., July 22, 1983, at 2, col. i; Metz, Anderson Clayton Seeking Foreign Ally to Top
Esmark in Bid for Norton Simon, Wall St. J., July 15, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
52. See generally Comment, The Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Offer, 78 Nw.
U.L. REv. 811 (1984).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1986).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1988).
55. Brudney and Chirelstein realized this fact before an explicit front-end loaded,
two-tiered offer was ever used. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1986).
57. 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981).
58. A "lock-up" option is an option to purchase shares or assets of a target corpora-
tion at a bargain price. It is frequently granted to induce a white knight to enter into a
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knight U.S. Steel, which included the sale of its crown jewel 9
should hostile bidder Mobil Corp.'s tender offer succeed, were
"manipulative" within the meaning of Section 14(e).10
The heavily criticized"1 Mobil decision, however, was too
flawed to have any persuasive impact on front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers. For example, in Radol v. Thomas,62 minority
shareholders of Marathon challenged the front-end loaded, two-
tiered bid of white knight U.S. Steel.6" U.S. Steel was offering
$125 per share in cash on the front-end and only its own notes
with a face value of $100, and an estimated value of approxi-
mately eighty-five dollars at the time of trial, on the back-end. 4
Following the reasoning of Mobil, the shareholders claimed that
bidding contest with a hostile bidder. See Lewkow & Forrest, The Lock-Up Under Ex-
change Act Section 14(e), Nat'l L.J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 15, col. 1; Fleischer & Raymond,
Lockups Ease Acquisition, May Forestall Bidding War, Legal Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at
13, col. 1.
Today, such devices must be carefully used to avoid legal difficulties. See Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)(invalidating poorly
planned lock-up option that unfairly favored management buyout group); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)(invalidating lock-up op-
tion that thwarted bidding process for target that board of directors had decided to sell).
59. A "crown jewel" is a prized asset or subsidiary that is the main attraction for a
hostile bidder. If that crown jewel is sold to a white knight, it may eliminate the hostile
bidder's incentive to continue the battle. See Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933
(N.D. II1. 1982); Herzel & Schmidt, Shareholders Can Benefit from Sale of "Crown Jew-
els", Legal Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 33, col. 1.
In the battle for control of Marathon Oil, Marathon granted two lock-up options to
white knight U.S. Steel. The first was a present, irrevocable option to purchase 17% of
Marathon's common stock at a bargain price, making acquisition of Marathon cheaper for
U.S. Steel than for Mobil. More important was the second option to purchase Marathon's
48 % interest in the rich Yates Oil Field, which could be exercised only if U.S. Steel's bid
failed and control of Marathon changed hands. This latter option meant that if Mobil
managed to win the tender offer battle, it would be left holding a half-empty shell, devoid
of the asset Mobil coveted most. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367-
70 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. The court held in part:
In our view, it is difficult to conceive of a more effective and manipulative device
than the "lock-up" options employed here, options which not only artificially
affect, but for all practical purposes completely block, normal healthy market
activity and, in fact, could be construed as expressly designed solely for that
purpose.
669 F.2d at 374.
61. E.g., Hochman, The Marathon Case, 14 REV. Sac. RaG. 827 (1981); Prentice,
supra note 2, at 351-60; Ferrara & Phillips, Courts Struggle to Define "Manipulative"
Practices, Legal Times, May 3, 1982, at 14, col. 1; Bialkin, Court Cases Cast Cloud over
Option Tactic in Takeovers, Legal Times, Jan. 11, 1982, at 19, col. 3.
62. 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
63. Id. at 1311.
64. Id.
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the two-tiered approach was manipulative because it "created 'ar-
tificial market influences' by coercing Marathon shareholders into
tendering their shares to U.S. Steel in order to avoid the risk of a
later freeze out."' 5
The Radol court rejected this argument. Judge Rubin, after
noting that all tender offers are to some extent coercive, concluded
that Congress meant to regulate tender offers "primarily through
mandatory disclosure provisions . .". "66 He noted that "both the
case law as well as pertinent SEC Rules and Regulations appear
to contemplate such [two-tiered] pricing arrangements. 67 The
most pertinent SEC rule, according to the court, was Rule 13e-
3,68 which applies disclosure requirements to a "going private"
transaction if it is in the form of a "clean-up" merger occurring
within one year after a tender offer has been made. This disclos-
ure requirement applies only if "equal consideration" is not paid
in the second step. By implication, as long as disclosures are
made, the payment of unequal consideration appears valid.69
In a similar case, Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., °
Bendix challenged Martin-Marietta's front-end loaded, two-tiered
"Pac-Man" counter tender offer as "manipulative" under Section
14(e). Judge Young's analysis stressed two Supreme Court deci-
sions: Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries and Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,7 the Supreme
Court held that Section 14(e) is solely a disclosure provision not
meant to regulate the substantive fairness of tender offers. Simi-
larly, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,72 the Court stated that
"manipulation" is a term of art in securities law, requiring decep-
tion, misrepresentation or nondisclosure; it does not encompass
mere unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, Judge
Young rejected Bendix's claim that a front-end loaded, two-tiered
offer is illegal because it is coercive. Judge Young held that
"Piper clearly dictates that Section 14(e) is violated only in in-
stances of deception. If the counter offer is in fact 'coercive' [as
Bendix claims], it would only be because its two-tier structure is
65. Id. at 1305.
66. Id. at 1312.
67. Id.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(1) (1988).
69. 534 F. Supp. at 1312.
70. 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
71. 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1977).
72. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
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revealed all too well."173
The Radol and Martin-Marietta holdings were later vindi-
cated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.7 4 The Court held that absent deception, there can
be no "manipulation" within the meaning of Section 14(e) and
that Congress did not intend to regulate the substantive fairness of
tender offers.7 5 Thus, in the early 1980s, a properly disclosed
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer did not create any legal
problems at the federal level as long as the second-step merger
was accompanied by the proper disclosures under Rule 13e-3. 8
B. State Law Challenges
As early as 1974, before the first use of an explicit front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offer, Professors Brudney and Chirel-
stein were concerned about the fairness of the second step of such
a transaction." Would such an offer violate state law under a
breach of fiduciary duty analysis? Hostile bidders owe no fiduci-
ary duty to the shareholders of the target corporation.78 Once the
hostile bidder has acquired a majority share of the target's stock
through the tender offer, however, can its actions in completing
the second-step merger be scrutinized under fiduciary standards?
The Supreme Court relegated litigation of this issue to state
courts by its ruling in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.79 This
73. 549 F. Supp. at 630.
74. 472 U.S. 1 (1985). In Schreiber, Burlington made a hostile tender offer for 25
million shares of El Paso Gas Co. El Paso's board initially opposed the hostile offer. How-
ever, in exchange for certain considerations, the El Paso board agreed to support a second
offer for only 21 million shares (four million more shares of treasury stock were to be sold
directly to Burlington). Id. at 3. Shareholders who tendered to the first offer, which was
then cancelled, found their tenders to the second offer subject to much greater proration.
They sued Burlington and the target board, claiming that the agreement to cancel the first
offer and replace it with the second constituted a "manipulative" act within the meaning of
Section 14(e). Because the deal was fully disclosed, however, there was no deception and
therefore no manipulation. Id. at 8-12.
75. Id. at 12.
76. See generally Note, Freezeout Merger Regulation: An SEC Rule Joins State
Efforts, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 964 (1980).
77. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 55, at 336; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Re-
statement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) [hereinafter Brudney &
Chirelstein II].
78. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 55, at 337; Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out
Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 508 (1976); Note, Singer v.
Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101, 1113-14 (1978).
79. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)(breach of fiduciary duty does not constitute "fraud"
remediable by § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
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ruling allowed the "entire fairness" approach, developed by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Singer v. Magnavox Co.80 and modi-
fied by several subsequent cases,"' to become the dominant mode
of analysis in the 1980s.
Singer required a court to examine the "entire fairness" of a
challenged second-step merger, concentrating on both fairness of
price and fairness of procedure. Singer also required that a busi-
ness purpose justify a freeze-out merger.82 Although some com-
mentators suggested that the "entire fairness" approach of Singer
and its progeny be applied to front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offers, 3 no court applied the Singer rationale to invalidate a lower
second-stage merger price.84 Thus, in 1982, state fiduciary stan-
dards posed little barrier to the front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer tactic.
Another potential barrier existed in the approximately thirty-
seven states that had tender offer laws which could be character-
ized as antitakeover in tone. 5 Although these laws did not directly
address the tactic, several contained provisions for review by state
officials of the substantive fairness of tender offers. A reviewing
state official had the authority to determine that front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers were unfair to target shareholders.
This potential barrier was struck down by the Supreme Court
in Edgar v. MITE Corp.86 The Court held that an Illinois tender
80. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). In Singer, North American purchased 84.1% of
Magnavox shares through a tender offer. Id. at 971. Later, it proposed to acquire the re-
maining shares by merging Magnavox into a wholly-owned subsidiary, thus cashing out the
remaining shareholders at the tender offer price. After the merger was approved, some
shareholders sued, alleging that the merger was fraudulent because it did not serve any
business purpose other than the forced removal of minority shareholders, and that the price
per share was grossly inadequate. Id. at 972.
81. E.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Naijar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979)(applying Singer's
holding to short-form mergers as well as long-form mergers); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977)(holding that "business purpose" of parent will
satisfy Singer's requirement for a squeeze-out merger).
82. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
83. E.g., Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valua-
tion Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485, 501 (1983); Shay, Current Trends in Takeovers, in 21sT
ANNUAL CORPORATE COUNSEL INSTITUTE 5-1, 5-4 (1982). See also Chazen, Fairness
From A Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party
Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1462-63 (1981)(suggesting
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers be judged according to their blended value).
84. Comment, supra note 52, at 829.
85. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
86. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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offer law87 containing a provision for substantive review of tender
offers by the Illinois Secretary of State was invalid. Although the
MITE opinion was fragmented and unclear, Justice White's plu-
rality opinion invalidated the Illinois Act on both Commerce
Clause and Supremacy Clause grounds.88 Only one leg of his
Commerce Clause analysis, however, was able to muster the sup-
port of a majority of the Court.89 Although the decision might
have been unclear, most commentators thought MITE sounded
the "death knell" for state regulation of tender offers.90 The lower
federal courts agreed, striking down similar laws in litigation aris-
ing out of tender offer battles.91
Thus, by the end of 1982, the front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer was flying high, having survived all state and federal
challenges to its legality. According to Judge Rubin, the validity
of these offers was implicitly recognized by the case law interpret-
87. Id. at 635. The Illinois Act also had an "early warning" provision that required a
tender offeror to file a registration statement with the Illinois Secretary of State at least 20
days before commencing the tender offer, thus giving the target time to implement various
defenses. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121- , para. 137.51-.70 (1979).
88. Justice White found that the Illinois Act, by unduly favoring target manage-
ment, conflicted with the Williams Act policy of neutrality and was therefore pre-empted
by it. He adopted the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "'[tihe state thus offers investor
protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach quite in conflict with that
adopted by Congress.'" Edgar, 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980)).
Under the Commerce Clause, Justice White found the Illinois Act unconstitutional as
a direct burden on interstate commerce. The Act applied to corporations that were not
formed in Illinois and corporations that had no shareholders in Illinois. If other states en-
acted such laws, a mass of conflicting regulations could apply to a single tender offer,
making its completion virtually impossible. Id. at 642.
Finally, White concluded that the Illinois Act was also an unconstitutional indirect
burden on interstate commerce. It deprived shareholders of their chance to tender at a
premium, hindered efficient allocation of resources, and removed a mechanism for encour-
aging efficient management. Id. at 643.
89. White's conclusion that the Illinois Act was an unconstitutional indirect burden
on interstate commerce gained the support of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Stevens, and O'Connor. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist did not reach the mer-
its of the claim because they felt it was moot. White's conclusion that the Act was also
unconstitutional as a direct burden on interstate commerce, however, gained the support of
only three other justices, and only two other justices joined his conclusion that the Illinois
Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act. Id. at 625.
90. E.g., Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation: Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN.
L. REv. 108 (1983); Note, The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017, 1052 (1983); Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover
Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL L. REv. 457, 476.
91. E.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines v. LLC Corp.,
687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
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ing the Williams Act and by the SEC rules promulgated under
the Act.92 Utilized with quite a bit of success, front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers constituted over twenty percent of all
tender offers, and experts were predicting an even bigger role for
them in the future.93
Five years later, however, the front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer had almost disappeared as an offensive weapon in
takeover battles.94 How did this happen? How could a tactic de-
scribed by its supporters as being as unstoppable as a slam dunk
by a 7'2" Lew Alcindor lose popularity so quickly? The bottom
line is that the perception that the front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer was coercive and unfair provided the impetus for
sweeping changes in the tender offer realm during this five-year
period, as the following sections of this Article will demonstrate.
II. IMPACT OF THE PERCEPTION OF COERCIVENESS ON FRONT-
END LOADED, Two-TIERED TENDER OFFERS
A. Impact on SEC Rules
Various changes in SEC Rules can be traced to the impact of
the perception that front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers are
coercive and unfair.
1. Rule 13e-3
In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,95 the Supreme Court
held that a challenge to a second-tier merger price alleging that it
was unfair was no concern of federal securities law as long as
there was no deception.96 The SEC was uncomfortable, however,
with relegating the protection of minority shareholders to state
courts, and began to consider rules to ensure their protection.
The Commission considered rules that would require substan-
tive fairness of price and a viable business purpose for second-tier
92. Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
93. Lederman, supra note 17, at 917.
94. Grundfest, supra note 41, at 26, col. 1.
95. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
96. Of course, the famous footnote 14 of Green left a loophole, which some plaintiffs
have been able to exploit. According to some courts, they may still take state law claims
into federal court if some deception by defendants prevented them from exercising their
state court rights. E.g., Kas v. Financial General Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1983); Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209, 220 (2d Cir. 1977).
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mergers."' In the end, however, they merely promulgated a rule
requiring more extensive disclosures in a "freeze-out" or "going-
private" merger.98 Although Rule 13e-39" is not aimed directly at
the explicit front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer, it is intended
to discourage a lower back-end payment by allowing an exception
to the filing requirement for a second-step merger price that is
equal to the first-step tender offer price.100 However, the disclos-
ure requirement is not very burdensome and the rule did little to
discourage front-end loaded, two-tiered bids.10' Furthermore, the
Radol court interpreted the very existence of the Rule 13e-3 ex-
ception as authorization of two-tiered bids by negative
implication.102
2. Rule 14d-8
The growth in the use of explicit front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offers was, at least in part, the result of various amend-
ments to the tender offer rules adopted by the SEC in 1979. The
Williams Act originally provided for withdrawal rights for share-
holders who tendered and then changed their minds. Section 14(e)
allowed withdrawal during the first seven calendar days of the
tender offer.'03 The SEC decided that this was not enough time
for the shareholders to make their decisions. Therefore, the Com-
mission (arguably without authority to contradict the Williams
Act)'0 4 adopted a rule in 1979 to allow withdrawal during the first
fifteen business days of an offer and within ten business days fol-
lowing the initiation of any competing tender offer.105 The Wil-
97. De Angelo, De Angelo & Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stock-
holder Wealth, 27 J. LAW & EcON. 367, 369 (1984).
98. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
Rule 13e-3 requires disclosure of such matters as the purpose of the transaction and the
reason for its structure, alternatives which were considered and why they were rejected,
and effects the transaction will have on all parties, including tax consequences. The disclos-
ure form is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1988).
99. Securities Act Release No. 6100, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1988).
100. Exchange Act Rule 13e-3(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g) (1988).
101. Lederman & Vlahakis, supra note 17, at 819.
102. See supra note 66-69 and accompanying text.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1986). The rule also allows withdrawal after an offer
has been effective for more than 60 calendar days if the shares have not yet been pur-
chased. This would be a relatively rare occurrence.
104. Lederman & Vlahakis, supra note 17, at 816.
105. See Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6158, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979); Tender Offers, Exchange Act
Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,373
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liams Act also provided for pro rata purchases of any shares ten-
dered during the first ten calendar days of a tender offer.106
Hostile bidders soon learned how to use these "proration pools" to
induce shareholders to tender and to refrain from exercising their
extended withdrawal rights under the 1979 amendments.
Two corporate legal strategists used the following hypotheti-
cal to demonstrate how the tactic could even be used to defeat
higher competing offers.
Bidder 1 offers to purchase up to 1,000,000 shares, out of
2,000,000 outstanding, at a price of $50.00 per share. Bidder 2
offers to purchase the same number of shares at $65.00 per
share. Bidder 1 subsequently raises its price to $60.00 per share
[which under "best price" rules must be paid even to those
shareholders who had tendered at $50.00], creates two proration
pools [one for those who tendered before the price increase and
one for those who tendered after] and announces that before the
increase in consideration 1,200,000 shares had been tendered.
If a shareholder tendered to Bidder 1 before the increase by
Bidder 1, he knows that if Bidder 1 is successful (no matter how
many shares are ultimately tendered) he will be subject to a pro-
ration factor of at most 2 in 12 and therefor [sic] will receive in
cash an amount $50.00 per share tendered (10/12 x $60). On
the other hand, if the shareholder tenders to Bidder 2, he faces
an unknown proration factor if Bidder 2 is successful. The
shareholder must then make the same calculations as profes-
sional arbitrageurs do on a daily basis, estimating the likelihood
of Bidder 2's success, the extent of oversubscription that would
be likely, and the effect of such over-subscription on the higher
price offered by Bidder 2. If, for example, 1,500,000 shares are
ultimately tendered to Bidder 2, the shareholder would receive
cash of only $43.33 per share.""7
The desire to be in a proration pool, coupled with the pres-
(Nov. 29, 1979).
106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
107. Lederman & Vlahakis, supra note 17, at 816. See also R. FERRARA, M. BROWN
& J. HALL, TAKEOVERS; ATTACK AND SURVIVAL 124-25 (1987); Ferrara, Carroll & Do-
zier, Tender Offers: Toughing It Out, in MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS IN THE 1980S, at 112-
17 (1987); Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Of-
fers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bids and Flip-Over Provisions Under Dela-
ware Law, I1 SEc. REG. LJ. 291, 292 (1984) (paraphrasing SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON
TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (July 8, 1983)(recommendation 12)).
Rules allowing multiple pools "may have served as a primary factor in the development of
two-tier offers by permitting offerors between 1980 and 1982 to structure partial tender
offers to place a significant premium upon tendering early." Id.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sure created by multiple pools, places very strong pressure on tar-
get shareholders to make the decision to tender within ten calen-
dar days, effectively cutting the twenty day "hold-open" period in
half. Additionally, because many smaller shareholders will not
tender, the value of the front-end for those who do tender is even
greater because they will have a higher percentage of their shares
purchased at the tender offer price.'08
The SEC responded directly to the pressure that front-end
loaded, two-tiered offers put on shareholders by its promulgation
of revised Rule 14d-8 in late 1982.109 The revised rule eliminated
multiple pools and restored effectiveness to the twenty day "hold-
open" requirement by extending the proration pool throughout the
duration of any partial tender offer. Partial offers were discour-
aged, in part, because "any-and-all" bidders now had a five-day
timing advantage - they could purchase at the end of the fifteen
day withdrawal period. Revised Rule 14d-8 was aimed directly at
blunting the effect of explicit front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offers,110 and there is evidence that it has had a small measure of
success."' Although there is doubt about whether the SEC had
the authority to issue Rule 14d-8,112 it remains on the books. On
the other hand, the rule did nothing to protect shareholders on the
back-end merger and, in light of the fifteen day withdrawal pe-
riod, did not significantly aid shareholders in thoroughly consider-
ing offers.
In 1986, the SEC extended withdrawal rights to last for the
entire duration of the offer. 113 This change gave shareholders
108. See Lederman, supra note 17, at 918-19.
109. Pro Rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19,336, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982). See also Masters, SEC Rule
May Not Stop Two-Tier Deals, Legal Times, Jan. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
110. See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs,
Exchange Act Release No. 21,079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S
83,637 (June 21, 1984); Proposed Pro Rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 18,761,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,222 (May 25, 1982); See also
Mirvis, supra note 83, at 485 n.l.
I 11. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
83,637 (June 21, 1984).
112. The SEC's rule directly contradicts the Williams Act's provision that proration
rights extend for only 10 calendar days, and is therefore of questionable legality. See Den-
nis, supra note 46, at 286-89; Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Con-
gressionally Selected Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 914, 936 (1983); Pozen, Extended
Proration Time for Tender Offers Proposed, Legal Times, July 12, 1982, at 15, col. 4.
113. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act
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longer to consider a front-end loaded, two-tiered offer, but elimi-
nated the timing advantage of an any-and-all bid. Eliminating this
feature had no major impact, however, since by this time many
other factors were also discouraging front-end loaded, two-tiered
offers.
3. Rule 14e-1
An amendment to Rule 14e-1,114 the minimum "hold-open"
requirement, also affected front-end loaded, two-tiered tender of-
fers. When adopted in late 1979, the rule provided that an amend-
ment to the consideration being offered in a tender bid would re-
quire that the offer be extended for a period of at least ten
business days. n 5 Therefore, a change in consideration on the nine-
teenth day would mean a total minimum hold-open period of at
least twenty-nine days. As discussed earlier, however, Esmark was
able to evade this rule."1 ' Esmark took advantage of the front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offer to capture Norton-Simon. By sim-
ply increasing the percentage of shares it intended to purchase in
the front-end, it effectively increased the blended price of the an-
nounced two-step transaction while maintaining a timing advan-
tage over a competing suitor. The court in McDermott, Inc. v.
Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc. held that changes in the percentage of
shares to be acquired did not constitute an increase in considera-
tion, even though the increase might have an effect on the blended
price of a two-step deal.117 In 1986, however, the SEC amended
Rule 14e-1 so that an increase in the percentage of shares sought
also triggered the extra ten-day "hold-open" requirement. 18
4. Refusal to Ban the Tactic
Although the SEC has amended its rules in a manner which
has had an adverse effect on the use of the front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer, it has expressly declined to ban the tactic. In
Release No. 23,421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,016 (July
11, 1986).
114. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979).
115. Id.
116. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
117. McDermott, Inc. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 649 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules: All Holders and Best Price, Exchange Act
Release No. 23,241, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,016 (July
11, 1986).
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1983, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers studied
the issue, reported its recommendations, and stated a "concern"
about the coercive impact of partial and two-tiered bids.119 How-
ever, the Advisory Committee recommended against prohibition
or even substantial regulation of such bids. In Recommendation
16, the Committee suggested that such bids would be sufficiently
discouraged if they were subjected to a "hold-open" period which
was two weeks longer than the "hold-open" period applicable to
"any-and-all" offers.12 0 After reviewing the Advisory Committee's
recommendations, however, the Commission decided not to follow
even this narrow recommendation.2 The SEC was not satisfied
that two-tiered tender offers were unduly coercive. Furthermore,
by 1984, when the SEC declined to act, the implementation of
Rule 14d-8 had already reduced the appeal of two-tiered pric-
ing. 22 Other developments, which will be discussed, had also re-
duced the usefulness of the front-end loaded, two-tiered bid.
B. Impact on Corporate Use of Defensive Tactics
Pre-planning has long been a part of a solid tender offer de-
fensive strategy. Corporate charter amendments, frequently
known as "shark repellents" or "porcupine provisions," are
119. SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
xxi (July 8, 1983) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM.].
120. Id. at 26.
121. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs, Ex-
change Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,637 (June 21, 1984).
122. Id. The SEC also argued that if the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer is
coercive, a two-week extension of the minimum offering period did not seem to be a very
strong response. Also, it was concerned that the regulation did not distinguish between two-
tiered bids and other partial bids. Finally, the Commission was concerned that the broader
implications for corporate control transactions had not been sufficiently considered. Id.
Congress also has failed to outlaw front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers. However,
the alleged unfairness of such offers led Rep. Timothy Wirth to introduce legislation to
eliminate partial bids for more than 10% of a target. Dennis, supra note 46, at 319-20.
Even after front-end loaded, two-tiered bids ceased to be a substantial portion of all tender
offers, their existence was still being cited in congressional hearings as justification for
passing tender offer legislation. See Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1985) (statement of Martin Lipton, attorney) [hereinafter
Hearings].
For an update on the progress of various tender offer reform bills, see Goelzer &
Quinn, Recent Developments in Tender Offer Regulation, in 2 TWENTIETH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTION ON SECURITIES REGULATION 97-109 (1988).
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designed to make takeovers more difficult.1 23 For example, a tar-
get corporation can insulate its board by eliminating the right of
shareholders to call special meetings or to remove directors with-
out cause, or it can stagger the board members' terms and intro-
duce cumulative voting so that a hostile bidder who has purchased
fifty-one percent of the shares cannot replace the entire board in
one annual meeting. The most popular of the pre-planned de-
fenses, fair price amendments and poison pills, owe much of their
popularity to the threat of front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offers.
1. Fair Price Provisions
When front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers became pop-
ular, American corporations responded. In 1984, for example, 372
major corporations submitted shark repellent charter amendments
for shareholder approval. Only seventeen were defeated. 24 The
fair price provision was the most popular shark repellent, account-
ing for approximately three-fourths of the total number of amend-
ments.125 Many major American corporations have them in place
today.1 26
A fair price charter amendment is intended to insure that all
shareholders are treated equally. It requires that shareholders
squeezed out in a back-end merger be given the same compensa-
tion as those who sold their shares in the front-end tender offer.
Fair price provisions are aimed directly at blocking front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offers, 27 which accounts for their popu-
larity with institutional investors.12 8 Because they are designed to
123. See generally 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §
6.03(2) (1984); Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law Tech-
niques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1978-79); Quinn, How to Avoid Unwanted Takeovers, I Corp.
Guide (P-H) 26,061, at 26,386 (1981).
124. Williams, Investors Vote on Bids to Fight Hostile Suitors, Wall St. J., Mar.
28, 1985, at 35, col. 3.
125. Ingersoll, 'Fair Price' Clause is Found Popular to Fight Takeovers, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 11, 1985, at 49, col. 2.
126. Grundfest, supra note 41, at 28, col. 1.
127. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate
Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 385, 393. Gubitosi, Takeover Defenses
May Be Getting More Difficult, CHEMICAL Bus., Oct. 17, 1983, at 33; Arieff, Surveys
Confirm Popularity of "Shark Repellents", Legal Times, May 30, 1983, at 2, col. 1-2;
Arieff, Drafting of "Shark Repellents" Receives Increased Attention, Legal Times, Feb.
21, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
128. Coffee, supra note 47, at 1181 (citing Blustein, Measures to Discourage Take-
overs Stir Controversy at Annual Meetings, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 29, col. 6).
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prevent unequal treatment of shareholders, fair price amendments
are "viewed as the most democratic of management proposals and
thus most likely to win shareholder approval." '29
2. Poison Pills
Shareholder rights plans, better known as "poison pills," are
a related form of pre-planned tender offer defense. A potential
target company issues each shareholder a "preferred" share for
each common share held. The preferred share remains dormant
unless a tender offeror acquires control of the corporation and at-
tempts a second-stage merger. The change of control activates the
preferred shares, which entitle the shareholder to purchase shares
in the new corporation formed by the second-stage merger at a
low price, thus greatly diluting the holdings of the hostile bidder.
In some cases, the preferred rights may be triggered before the
second-step merger, when the hostile bidder acquires a certain
percentage of the target's stock. 3 '
One of the main purposes of poison pills, which have been
adopted by over 520 American companies,'' is to deter front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offers.132 Commentators have argued
that such drastic measures can only be justified if they are used to
defeat front-end loaded, two-tiered bids. 33
Although fair price amendments and poison pills are the most
lethal counter weapons, "[the supposed unfairness of two-tiered
[tender] offers is presented as the only justification for a variety of
129. Girding for the Proxy Wars: In Takeovers, Management Can No Longer Count
Out Big Stockholders, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 16, 1984, at 46.
130. See generally Dawson, Pence & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42
Bus. LAW. 423 (1987); Helman & Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus. LAW.
771 (1987).
131. Lee, "Poison Pills" Benefit Shareholders By Forcing Raiders to Pay More for
Targets, Study Says, Wall St. J.,Mar. 31, 1988, at 55, col. 3. This justification has been
challenged by Oesterle, who notes that poison pills are most often used to block any-and-all
bids. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Su-
preme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 123 n.30 (1986). This is true, in part, because
two-tiered bids are on the way out. One reason is the advent of the poison pill. Another is
that it takes a fairer, more attractive bid for a hostile bidder to overcome a poison pill.
132. Richard, Brussard & Williams, Rights Plans Developments and Recent Litiga-
tion, Nat'l L.J., May 23, 1988, at 28, col. 1; Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 130, at
425. Masters, "Poison Pill" Takeover Defense Stirs Controversy Uncertainty, Legal
Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
133. Lewkow & Groll, Selected Issues in Acquisition Defense, in ACQuISITONS &
TAKEOVERS 286 (1988); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered
Takeovers: The Poison Pill Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1965, 1971 (1984).
[Vol. 39:389
TENDER OFFERS
[other] defensive techniques."""
C. Impact on the Business Judgment Rule
The fiduciary duty, which a target board of directors owes
target shareholders when engaging in various defensive tactics to
ward off tender offers, has generally been gauged by the business
judgment rule.'35 The rule's presumption, which assumes that the
directors' actions are valid, has been used to protect extreme de-
fensive measures.' 36 Although a few early cases had derailed ex-
cessive defensive tactics, 13  at the time when the front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offer came into vogue, the business judgment
rule constituted a "nearly insurmountable obstacle"'383 to any
shareholder claim that the board was violating its fiduciary duty.
The rule, which in state courts led to "almost complete deference"
to target management discretion,' 39 became the subject of great
134. Dennis, supra note 46, at 319. See also Finkelstein, supra note 107, at 294
(listing an entire series of shark repellent amendments that target companies have investi-
gated primarily to respond to two-tiered offers).
135. One formulation of the "business judgment rule" is as follows:
In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of a gross
abuse of discretion the business judgment of the directors will not be interfered
with by the courts . . . . The acts of directors are presumptively acts taken in
good faith and inspired for the best interests of the corporation, and a minority
stockholder who challenges their bona fides of purpose has the burden of proof
(citation omitted).
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966). See gener-
ally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979)(discuss-
ing genesis of the rule); Wander & Lecoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Trans-
actions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29 (1986)(discussing purpose
and application of the business judgment rule).
136. One of the most extreme instances occurred when Carter Hawley Hale (CHH)
was planning a hostile tender offer for control of Marshall Field & Co., whose stock was
trading at about $20/share. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The contemplated tender offer of $42/share was called off
after Marshall Field's board acquired some retail stores with the major motivation of creat-
ing an antitrust problem for CHH if it should proceed with the tender offer. Id. at 280.
After the offer was aborted, Marshall Field's stock fell to below $20/share. This obviously
upset some Marshall Field shareholders, but the Seventh Circuit overruled their legal ob-
jections on the basis of the business judgment rule. Id. at 295.
See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980)(stock sale to
avert takeover upheld); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980)(sale of shares
to friendly third party upheld), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
137. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)(liquidation of all corporate assets----"corporate suicide"-enjoined).
138. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 926 (1979).
139. Couric, Takeover Defense Costs Insured, Legal Times, Nov. 3, 1980, at 3, col.
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debate among commentators. Some defended deference on eco-
nomic grounds and argued that tender offers should never be im-
peded. 140 Others could not understand why the business judgment
rule's presumption of validity was being applied in the tender offer
context at all, and argued that tender offers create an inherent
conflict of interest for target management.' 4
A major turning point came in 1984 in Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc.'42 The hostile bidder purchased thirty-two per-
cent of Norlin's shares in a series of market transactions. Fearful
of an imminent takeover, Norlin's board transferred 28,395 shares
of common stock to a wholly-owned subsidiary in exchange for
cancellation of a promissory note. It then transferred 800,000
more authorized, but unissued, shares to the same subsidiary in
exchange for a promissory note. Finally, it created an employee
stock option plan, appointed three board members as trustees of
the plan, and then transferred 185,000 shares to the plan in ex-
change for a promissory note. Within a few days, Norlin's board
had transferred forty-nine percent of Norlin's shares to entities
controlled by the board itself.' 43 The board admitted that the only
business purpose behind the maneuvers was to defeat the potential
tender offer and that its shenanigans might cause Norlin shares to
be delisted by the New York Stock Exchange. 44
Applying New York law, the Second Circuit became one of
the first courts to follow traditional corporate law in the tender
offer setting by refusing to apply the business judgment rule when
the directors were in a self-serving situation. The court held that
when there is a conflict of interest, the burden of proof shifts to
2 (quoting tender offer expense insurer). See also Blustein, Courts Give Firms More Power
to Fight Takeovers, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 33, col. 3 (describing how the self-
interest of one director cannot be imputed to the remainder of the board).
140. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981). This article proposes a rule
of managerial passivity, whereby management would not be allowed to resist takeovers,
resulting in higher share value to holders of the stock.
141. E.g., Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in
a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403 (1980)("We believe that the tender offer case
and state law must recognize the true role of target management - that of a party with
great interest in the outcome of the offer."); Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 138, at 915
("[O]nly a rare individual can affiliate closely with a corporation and still view an offeror's
takeover attempt with detachment."); Prentice, supra note 2, at 344 (discussing the una-
voidable conflict of interest which management faces in a hostile take-over).
142. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 259.
144. Id. at 259-60.
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the directors to demonstrate that their actions are in the best in-
terests of the shareholders.14 The Norlin directors were unable to
satisfy that burden.
After Norlin it was no longer taboo for courts to question the
bona fides of target directors engaged in defensive tactics. The
notorious Smith v. Van Gorkom146 decision gave this new thrust a
boost by rejecting the business judgment rule as a defense for di-
rectors who had not done their homework prior to entering into an
agreement to sell the corporation. 47
Closer judicial scrutiny of defensive tactics is clearly exempli-
fied by Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 48
in which Pantry Pride made a hostile bid for Revlon at $47.50 per
share, even after Revlon had enacted a poison pill.149 Revlon en-
gaged in various defensive tactics, which prompted Pantry Pride
to raise its bid to $53 per share. 5 0 Two days later, Revlon ap-
proved a leveraged buyout by white knight Forstmann at $56 per
share under the condition that Revlon cancel the poison pill. Pan-
try Pride raised its offer to $56.25.151 Forstmann responded by
agreeing to raise its bid to $57.25 contingent upon Revlon: (a)
giving it a lock-up option to buy two Revlon divisions for $100-
$175 million below market value if another acquirer bought Rev-
lon, (b) signing a "no shop" agreement not to seek another bidder,
(c) removing the poison pill, and (d) paying a $25 million "good-
bye" fee if another acquirer bought more than 19.9% of Revlon's
stock. ' 52 Revlon's consent to these conditions led Pantry Pride to
raise its offer to $58, contingent on nullification of the pill. 53 Pan-
try Pride then challenged Revlon's actions in court.
The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against Revlon. The
court held that once the Revlon board brought in white knight
Forstmann, it had clearly made a decision to sell the company.
145. Id. at 264.
146. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
147. Id. at 872. See generally Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business
of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986); Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985);
Herzel, Davis & Coiling, "Smith" Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs, Legal Times,
May 13, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
148. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
149. Id. at 177.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 178.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 179.
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Once that decision had been made, "[t]he directors' role changed
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.' 1 54 The various advantages the Revlon board had given
Forstmann were inconsistent with this role as auctioneer, because
they discouraged rather than encouraged competitive bidding.
The Cases Allowing Greater Leeway in Response to Two-Tiered
Tender Offers
Since Norlin, the tide of cases has run in favor of closer judi-
cial scrutiny of defensive tactics and against allowing a target
board of directors to shield its actions behind the business judg-
ment rule.155 However, when a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offer is involved, courts have paid greater deference to the direc-
tors' discretion.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.'5 6 involved a selective
self-tender offer known as a "lollipop."'15 7 Mesa, led by T. Boone
Pickens, launched a front-end loaded, two-tiered bid for 37 % (it
already owned 13 %) of Unocal Corp. 58 The front-end tender of-
fer price was $54 per share in cash, the back-end merger price
was $54 per share in the form of highly subordinated junk
bonds.' 59 After being advised by its investment banker that the
154. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
155. See generally Herzel & Shepro, The Changing Fortunes of Takeover Defenses,
15 SEC. REG. L.J. 116 (1987); Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Commit-
tee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection, 43 Bus. LAW. 665 (1988); Note, Cor-
porate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment
Rule, 87 MICH. L. REv. 276 (1988); Mirvis, Takeover Defense Shaped By Business Judg-
ment Rule, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 33, col. 3 ("The whole range of defensive actions has
come under closer, if not close, scrutiny."); Block & Hoff, Duties of Directors Facing
Takeover Offer, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Cherno & Gottlieb, The "Level
Playing Field" in Takeover Contests, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1987, at 21, col. 1 (Recent "cases
reveal a heightened level of judicial review of a target board's actions in bidding contests
arising out of hostile takeover attempts."); Lesser, Directors, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at
17, col. I ("[T]he courts are scrutinizing the [target board's] decision-making process with
increasing rigor.").
156. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
157. See Leefeldt, A Sweet Way to Foil Takeover Bids, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1985,
at 24, col. 4.
158. 493 A.2d at 949.
159. A "junk bond" is, by definition, a highly speculative security promising ex-
traordinary returns. These securities were pioneered by the investment banking firm
Drexel, Burnham Lambert, Inc. in its salad days before the Boesky scandal and helped
finance a good portion of the recent wave in tender offers. See Williams, How "Junk
Financings" Aid Corporate Raiders in Hostile Acquisitions, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1984, at
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Mesa bid was inadequate, the Unocal board announced a selective
self-tender offer to repurchase a large percentage of its own shares
at $72 per share.1 60 The self-tender offer was selective because it
was open to all Unocal shareholders except Mesa. Mesa sued,
challenging its exclusion from the bid.
Following the Norlin line of reasoning, the Delaware Su-
preme Court stressed that although a target board of directors has
a responsibility to protect the interests of its shareholders, it does
not have "unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by
any Draconian means available."' 61 In spite of the inherent con-
flict of interest, however, the board was entitled to the protection
of the business judgment rule because it demonstrated that it had
"reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate pol-
icy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock
ownership.' ' 2 In Unocal the board was able to show that it had
acted in good faith, in part, because a board consisting of a major-
ity of outside directors made a reasonable investigation into the
adequacy of the offer.' 63
The court also emphasized the importance of balance, stating
that "[i]f a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed."'' 6 4 The court found that a reasonable relationship
existed between the defensive tactic and the threat posed for the
following reason:
Here, the threat posed was viewed by the Unocal board as a
grossly inadequate two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with
the threat of greenmail.
Specifically, the Unocal directors had concluded that the
value of Unocal was substantially above the $54 per share of-
fered in cash at the front end. Furthermore, they determined
that the subordinated securities to be exchanged in Mesa's an-
nounced squeeze out of the remaining shareholders in the "back-
end" merger were "junk bonds" worth far less than $54. It is
now well recognized that such offers are a classic coercive mea-
sure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the
first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what
1, col. 6.
160. 493 A.2d at 950-51.
161. Id. at 955.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 958.
164. Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
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they will receive at the back end of the transaction. Wholly be-
yond the coercive aspect of an inadequate two-tier tender offer,
the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national repu-
tation as a "green-mailer."
In adopting the selective exchange offer, the board stated
that its objective was either to defeat the inadequate Mesa offer
or, should the offer still succeed, provide the 49% of its stock-
holders, who would otherwise be forced to accept "junk bonds,"
with $72 worth of senior debt. We find that both purposes are
valid.
However, such efforts would have been thwarted by Mesa's
participation in the exchange offer. First, if Mesa could tender
its shares, Unocal would effectively be subsidizing the former's
continuing effort to buy Unocal stock at $54 per share. Second,
Mesa could not, by definition, fit within the class of shareholders
being protected from its own coercive and inadequate tender
offer.
165
Soon after this decision, the SEC outlawed the "lollipop" se-
lective self-tender offer with its "All Holders Rule,"1M6 which re-
quires that a tender offer be open to all shareholders equally, in-
cluding hostile greenmailers. Nonetheless, Unocal clearly made
the point that front-end loaded, two-tiered bids are a drastic
threat to the interests of target shareholders and justify drastic
defensive measures.
Although several cases have struck down poison pills put in
place by target management, 167 the leading case upholding the
poison pill, not coincidentally, involved a defense against a per-
ceived front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer. In Moran v.
Household International, Inc.,6 8 the plaintiff, a director of
Household, was contemplating a takeover of Household by an-
165. Id. at 956 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).
166. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules - All Holders and Best-Price, Exchange
Act Release No. 23,421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016
(July 11, 1986).
167. E.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries,
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1987); R.D. Smith
& Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986)(denying a motion to enjoin the
implementation of a poison pill because plaintiffs failed to show the requisite irreparable
harm, but stating that a challenge to the merits of the poison pill would likely succeed);
Grand Metro. Pub. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., Civ. No. 10139, slip op. at 29-30 (Del. Ch. Dec.
16, 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 94,071 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 94,072 (Del. Nov. 2,
1988).
168. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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other corporation which he controlled. In the face of that threat,
the Household board adopted a poison pill which entitled House-
hold common stockholders to the issuance of one "right" (redeem-
able by the board for fifty cents each) per common share under
two conditions: the announcement of a tender offer for thirty per-
cent of Household or the acquisition of twenty percent of the cor-
poration by a single bidder. If the first condition occurred, the
"rights" were to be issued and could be exercised immediately to
purchase 1/100th of a share of new preferred stock for $100. If
the second condition occurred, the "rights" were to be issued,
were to become nonredeemable, and could be exercised to
purchase 1/100th of a share of preferred. If a "right" was not
exercised for a preferred share when it was issued, and a merger
or consolidation occurred later, the "rights" holder could then ex-
ercise each "right" to buy $200 of the common stock of the tender
offeror for $100, thus severely diluting the position of any hostile
bidder.16 9
The Delaware Supreme Court viewed this poison pill more
favorably because it was pre-planned, rather than an after-the-
fact response to a bid. It was thus less likely that the poison pill
was being instituted solely to entrench management. 170 The court,
following its reasoning in Unocal, determined that the poison pill,
although an extreme measure, was reasonable in relation to the
threat posed. And what threat was posed? According to the court:
"Household has adequately demonstrated . . . that the adoption
of the Rights Plan was in reaction to what it perceived to be the
threat in the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers." '
169. Id. at 1348-49.
170. Id. at 1350.
171. Id. at 1356. The Household board was also concerned with the possibility of
other offensive tactics such as "bootstrap" and "bust-up" takeovers, especially if they took
the form of two-tier bids. Id. at 1357. The court cited its own language from Unocal re-
garding the coercive nature of two-tiered bids. Id. at 1357 n.14.
See also Desert Partners, L.P. U. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (N.D. I11.
1988)(upholding use of poison pill in light of hostile two-tiered bid); Southdown, Inc. v.
Moore McCormick Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988)(since all-cash bid
was non-coercive, target management's poison pill defensive activities were not fully justi-
fied); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,680 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 1988)(upholding poison pill used to defend
against front-end loaded, two-tiered bid); Facet Enter., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., C.A.
No. 9746 (Del. Ch. April 11, 1988)(upholding poison pill even in the midst of an auction
because it could still benefit shareholders by deterring street sweeps or front-end loaded
offers). But see Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,685 (D. Del. March 16, 1988)(auction duty not
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Another controversial defensive tactic which has been consid-
ered in relation to two-tiered bids is the "golden parachute,"
which typically grants generous (sometimes lavish) severance ben-
efits to target management should a hostile takeover actually oc-
cur.172 Frequently, the hostile bidder need not even fire the man-
agers; they may voluntarily quit and still receive the benefits. As a
defensive tactic, the golden parachute has the advantage of mak-
ing the target corporation more expensive to acquire. When the
hostile bidder buys the target, it acquires the target's contractual
obligations, including the golden parachutes. Although there is lit-
tle definitive litigation on the validity of golden parachutes, 73 not
surprisingly, the leading case approving the measure involved a
threatened front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer.
In Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corporation, 2 4  Ropak an-
nounced a cash tender offer for any-and-all Buckhorn shares after
negotiations for a friendly merger had broken down. 75 The Buck-
horn board engaged in a number of defensive tactics. It author-
ized a fruitless search for acquisition candidates or purchasers for
its crown jewels to derail the Ropak offer, it instituted a poison
pill, and it granted "golden parachute" severance agreements
worth $750,000 and substantial stock options to six key
executives."'0
The district court generally approved the use of the poison
pill, but invalidated the price because the board had not done suf-
ficient homework before setting it.177 The court's reasoning for ap-
eliminated by fact that one of the bids is two-tiered); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF,
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(refusing to allow alleged front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer as justification for "scorched earth" defensive tactics that violated state
corporate law, were undertaken primarily to entrench target management, and would have
deterred any unfriendly offer).
172. See Moore, Business Grows Bolder in Giving Lucrative Golden Parachutes, Le-
gal Times, Mar. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 2; Prokesch, Too Much Gold in the Parachute?, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1986, at Fl, col. 1.
173. Most analyses of golden parachutes have seriously questioned their practical
legitimacy as a hostile takeover defense. E.g., Moore, Golden Parachutes Appearing Vul-
nerable, Legal Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at I; Riger, Taking a New Look at the Validity of
Golden Parachute Agreements, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 26, col. I. But see Herzel,
Golden Parachute Contracts: Analysis, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 20, col. I (suggesting
parachutes perform a useful economic function by equalizing executive compensation with
risks they must endure).
174. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
175. Id. at 215.
176. Id. at 216-18.
177. Id. at 231.
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proving the poison pill was similar to that of Moran and Revlon,
although the Ropak bid was purportedly an any-and-all cash offer.
In determining whether the Buckhorn board's use of the poison
pill was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Ropak, the
court held:
There is no question that the directors understood and appreci-
ated the fact that Ropak's offer, on its face, was a cash offer for
any and all shares of Buckhorn. However, notwithstanding their
understanding of the terms of the offer, the directors believed
that the offer was, in fact, a two-tiered tender offer. The basis
for this belief was rooted in the fact that Ropak had no cash on
hand, but instead had to secure financing for the entire transac-
tion. Furthermore, the directors believed that if Ropak could not
secure sufficient financing to purchase all the shares or, alterna-
tively, if some shares were not tendered, Ropak would exchange
Ropak securities for the Buckhorn stock held by these share-
holders. Given the debt structure of Ropak, which would only be
increased by the acquisition of Buckhorn stock, the directors
were concerned that the Ropak securities which these sharehold-
ers would receive would be of less value than the Buckhorn se-
curities. These concerns were buttressed . . . by Mr. Downen,
Buckhorn's investment banker, who was skeptical about Ropak's
ability to secure financing for the entire acquisition and about
the quality of the Ropak securities exchanged for non-tendering
and "back-end" Buckhorn shareholders.
The Court does not believe that the directors' fears about
the potential two-tiered nature of the Ropak offer and its impact
on back-end or non-tendering shareholders were unreasonable.7 8
The court also validated the golden parachute severance
agreements. They were reasonably based on Buckhorn's concern
about "losing its key management at a critical time of transi-
tion. ' 179 Although the court did not explicitly tie its approval of
the golden parachutes to the threat of a functional two-tiered of-
fer, it stressed that defensive tactics must be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed and that two-tiered tender offers justify more
radical defensive tactics than "any-and-all" offers.'80
178. Id. at 228-29.
179. Id. at 232-33. However, the court did invalidate certain stock option plans be-
cause they greatly diluted the interests of the common shareholders without adding much
incentive for the executives to stay on the job beyond those already provided by the golden
parachute severance agreements. Id. at 233.
180. Id. at 229. Clearly, in this case it is the perception that the Ropak offer is two-
tiered in nature which creates the threat that some shareholders will be relegated to minor-
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In a similar case, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Cor-
poration,8 ' Newmont had blocked a takeover attempt by Gold
Fields, which owned 26% of Newmont. Newmont had signed a
three-year "standstill" agreement' 82 with Gold Fields,. which Gold
Fields could cancel if any other party bought more than 9.9% of
Gold Fields.' 83 Ivanhoe Partners, led by T. Boone Pickens,
launched a $95 per share tender offer for 42% of Newmont's
stock. Ivanhoe said that it would seek to obtain the remaining
Newmont shares at the same price, but did not commit itself to do
SO.'
8 4
Faced with threats from two sides, Newmont engaged in deli-
cate defensive maneuvers. The board installed golden parachutes
and signed a $2.25 billion "cyanide capsule." 8 These maneuvers
led Ivanhoe to increase its bid to $105 per share.186 Then
Newmont announced a $33 per share nondiscriminatory divi-
dend, 17 which Gold Fields could use in a "street sweep"' 88 to
purchase up to 49 % of Newmont.'89 In exchange for the dividend,
Gold Fields entered into a ten-year standstill agreement which
ity or back-end status. It is in the protection of this potential class of shareholders that the
court finds justification for the Buckhorn directors' poison pill plan. If the offer were per-
ceived as merely an "any-and-all" shares offer, no such class of shareholders would exist
and the poison pill would lack justification.
181. 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.), affd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
182. In a "standstill" agreement, a potential bidder, in exchange for consideration,
agrees not to pursue certain aggessive takeover measures, such as starting a proxy fight or
a tender offer. See generally Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and
Business Considerations Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U.L. REV. 143
(1982); Note, The Standstill Agreemeni: A Case of Illegal Vote Selling and a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, 93 YALE L.J. 1093 (1984).
183. 533 A.2d at 591.
184. Id. at 595-96.
185. Id. at 595. A "cyanide capsule" is a provision in a contract that calls for rene-
gotiation or immediate payment upon a change of control. In this case, Newmont had lined
up a $2.25 billion line of credit which could be deemed in default if any entity other than
Gold Fields acquired control of Newmont. A cyanide capsule is a non-stock related version
of a poison pill. For a discussion of poison pills, see Gerlits & Barnard, Poison Pill Take-
over Defense Lays Open Corporate Boards, Nat'l L.J., May 27, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
186. 533 A.2d at 597.
187. Id.
188. In a "street sweep" a buyer goes into the market during or immediately after a
tender offer and buys large amounts of shares, usually from arbitrageurs at a premium over
market. The SEC is not at all fond of street sweeps, which normally are a disadvantage to
the small investor. See Blanc, Commission Proposes to Outlaw Market Sweeps, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 28, col. 1; Bagley & Chuh, Takeover Defense in the Wake of "Carter
Hawley", Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 15, col. 1. While these articles use the term "mar-
ket sweeps," the term "street sweeps" is used in Ivanhoe. 533 A.2d at 597.
189. 533 A.2d at 597.
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bound Gold Fields to vote its shares with Newmont management
for director nominees and restricted Gold Field's ability to sell its
shares. 190 In response, Ivanhoe reduced its bid to $78 per share, in
order to account for the money paid out in the dividend, and
joined a class of Newmont shareholders in suing to enjoin the
street sweep and the Newmont defensive tactics. 9 '
The trial court denied almost all aspects of the requested re-
lief.19 The court's discussion of whether the defensive tactics were
reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the Ivanhoe offer
echoed its reasoning in Buckhorn:
[The board's] conclusion that the Ivanhoe offer - a two-tier
offer having no assured "back end" merger at the same ($105)
price - was inadequate, was supported by the Unocal decision,
which recognized the inherently coercive nature of a two-tier of-
fer that one of the same offerors (Mesa Petroleum) had made
two years before.9 3
These cases demonstrate that when an explicit or implicit
two-tiered tender offer is involved, courts are more likely to go
against the current trend of more stringent judicial scrutiny and
restraint of defensive tactics'" and allow target management
190. Id. at 597-98.
191. Id. at 598.
192. The trial court refused to enjoin the golden parachutes, the cyanide capsule, the
dividend, or the street sweep. It did conclude that the ten-year standstill agreement went
too far in entrenching Newmont's management. The Gold Fields' 49.9% share which
would be controlled by Newmont's board went too far in "locking up" control and making
any tender offer for as long as ten years an impossibility. Id. at 608. Newmont and Gold
Fields then amended the standstill agreement to meet the trial judge's objections. The Del-
aware Supreme Court then affirmed all aspects. Ivanhoe Parners v. Newport Mineral
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1334 (Del. 1987).
193. 533 A.2d at 607 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 956
(Del. 1985)).
194. The causal relationship between the presence of front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offers and the decisions of courts should not be overstated. One can detect a strong
correlation in the cases cited above, but two authors have recently taken the position that
although courts are carefully scrutinizing how boards fulfill their "auctioneer" role, once
they have decided to sell the company, the directors are still given great discretion to battle
a hostile offer in an attempt to keep the company independent. Johnson & Siegel, Corpo-
rate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 334
(1987). Although they make a valid point, their argument fails to account for all the cases,
including the following: Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd
on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d
255 (2d Cir. 1984); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,072 (Del. Nov. 2, 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton
& Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. 1986); Grand Metro. Pub. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., Civ. No. 10319
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
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greater discretion in fending off the takeover.
D. Impact on State Tender Offer Laws
As noted earlier, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision
in Edgar v. MITE Corporation,'95 the lower federal courts invali-
dated a host of state tender offer statutes (statutes drafted before
MITE are called "first generation" statutes) on Supremacy
Clause and Commerce Clause grounds.198 Undaunted, approxi-
mately thirty states passed "second generation" statutes designed
to avoid these constitutional problems.19 7 These statutes can be
grouped into five rough categories:' 98
First, there are the "fair price" or "second-tier" statutes.
This type of regulation was pioneered in Maryland"99 and quickly
became the most popular form of second generation statute. °0
The statute typically requires that a tender offeror either pay a
"fair price" (a price that is as high or higher than the tender offer
price) in the second-step merger, or obtain a supermajority ap-
proval of the other shareholders, before completing the second-
step merger.
A second category consists of "shareholder redemption" stat-
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,084 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans,
Civ. No. 9953 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1988). Of course, judicial reaction to front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers does not account for all major recent decisions, and this Article
does not advance that claim.
195. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
196. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
197. See Prentice, The Role of States in Tender Offer Regulations: An Analysis of
CTS, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6. Fifteen states had tender offer laws on the books
before CTS was decided: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia. Fourteen states have passed tender offer laws since CTS: Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
198. I borrow these categories, with some relabeling, from Professor Pinto, who also
discussed two other categories: the Fiduciary Duty Model and the Full Disclosure Model.
Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate Law, 41
U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 478-83 (1987). The Fiduciary Duty Model was pioneered in Penn-
sylvania and authorizes a target board to consider the interests of constituencies other than
its shareholders (such as employees and communities) in planning tender offer responses.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1988). The Full Disclosure Model, exem-
plified in Minnesota, supplements Williams Act disclosure requirements. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80B.03 (West 1986).
199. MD. CORPS. & ASS'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985).
200. Hanks, State Takeover Laws: The Second Generation, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1986,
at 34, col. 1.
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utes. The "shareholder redemption" statute was pioneered in
Pennsylvania 01 and patterned after British tender offer regula-
tions.20 2 It requires any shareholder who acquires a certain per-
centage of shares, for example, thirty percent, to buy out the re-
maining shareholders at "fair value" if they so demand. "Fair
value" normally requires payment of at least as high a price as
was paid in the tender offer.20 3
"Control share acquisition" statutes comprise a third cate-
gory of these second generation statutes. Pioneered in Ohio,204
these statutes typically will not allow a potential acquirer of
shares to complete a purchase that would put him over certain
thresholds of ownership without first obtaining the approval of the
other shareholders.
A fourth category of these statutes, the "voting rights" stat-
utes, was first adopted in Indiana,2 °5 and is similar to a control
share acquisition statute. It allows the offeror to acquire the
shares that give him control of the corporation, but does not allow
him to vote them without receiving the approval of the other
shareholders.
Finally, there are the "business combination" statutes which
were originated in New York20 and modified in Delaware. 207
These statutes allow an acquirer to purchase shares and to vote
them. However, he cannot complete the normally-desired second-
stage merger for a period of three to five years without receiving
director approval or the approval of the other shareholders. Even
after the specified waiting period, the second-step merger can oc-
cur only if the other shareholders approve or the acquirer pays a
"fair price" as determined by statutory formula.20 8
201. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1409.1(C)(1)-(3)(Purdon Supp. 1988); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
202. See DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the
British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 960-62 (1983).
203. Pinto, supra note 198, at 480 n.39; Booth, supra note 28, at 1679.
204. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, .831 (Anderson 1985).
205. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1986).
206. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986).
207. See Veasey, A Statute Was Needed To Stop Abuses, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1988, at F2, col. 1.
208. Id. See also Bandow, Curbing Raiders is Bad for Business, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1988, at F2, col. 1; Pinto & McGrath, Problems and Issues Raised in State's New
Takeover Law, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, col. 1.
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1. Purpose and Effect of Second Generation Statutes
All five of the most popular second generation statutes dis-
courage front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers.2"9 The fair
price statute protects the shareholders who did not tender in the
first tier from a lower second-tier price by requiring that they re-
ceive as much compensation in the second-step merger as the
shareholders who tendered in the first step received. 10 The share-
holder redemption statute has an identical effect. The shareholder
who did not tender can decide to sell later and be assured of re-
ceiving as high a price as those who did tender.211 Obviously both
the fair price and the shareholder redemption statutes reduce the
"stampede" effect of front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers by
protecting the interests of minority shareholders in the second-step
freeze-out merger. The shareholder redemption statute clearly en-
courages any-and-all offers, because a hostile bidder who com-
mences a front-end loaded, two-tiered offer may be forced to re-
deem 100% of the target's shares.212
The control share acquisition law also discourages front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offers by allowing the target sharehold-
ers to vote as a group to determine their own destiny. Instead of
being trapped in the "prisoner's dilemma" and being forced to act
individually out of fear of what other shareholders will do, the
shareholders democratically determine their own fate as a
group.21 The voting rights model has the same effect, because
most offerors will not wish to acquire non-voting shares.21 4 Under
both statutes, shareholders can tender to protect their interests,
yet vote against bids they consider inadequate. Risk aversion no
longer forces them to tender to an offer they oppose.
The business combination statute also encourages "any-and-
all" offers. A bidder who attempts a front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer finds himself waiting three to five years before he can
effect the planned second-step merger, and even then he probably
will have to pay at least as much as the original tender offer
209. See, Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REv. 203, 222-25 (1987).
210. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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price.215
There is evidence that these statutes were purposely designed
to blunt the impact of two-tiered tender offers. The legislative his-
tory of the first fair price statute in Maryland clearly indicates
this purpose.2 16 Commentators agree that the Pennsylvania share-
holder redemption provisions were aimed directly at stopping two-
tiered offers. 17 The legislative history of the original control share
acquisition statute in Ohio contains a finding of fact that tender
offers are coercive,21 and the Missouri version is clearly aimed at'
protecting shareholders from front-end loaded, two-tiered offers.219
The Indiana version of a voting rights statute has been justified on
the basis of its deterrent effect on front-end loaded, two-tiered of-
fers.220 Although the New York business combination statute has
been justified as deterring front-end loaded, two-tiered offers,221 it
is more directly aimed at discouraging highly leveraged offers.222
On the other hand, the Delaware legislature focused directly on
the prisoner's dilemma created by front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offers when passing its antitakeover legislation. 23
One can conclude that the bad reputation224 of front-end
215. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
216. Hanks, Maryland-Type Takeover Statutes: Are They "Fair Price" or Foul
Ball?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 32, col. 2., (cited in DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE OF MARYLAND, STAFF REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1983, at 9, 14,
50 (1983)). See also Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Gener-
ation," 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 332, 352 (1986); Garrity, Post-MITE State Takeover Statutes:
Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 42 Bus. LAW. 586, 589 (1987); Warren, Develop-
ments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAw. 670, 697
(1985).
217. Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The
Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REV. 731, 748 (1986); Newlin &
Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflect-
ing Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAW. 111, 113 (1984); Sargent, Do the Second-
Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3, 11
(1985).
218. See Sargent, supra note 217, at 31 n.85 (1985) (citing Ohio Substitute House
Bill No. 822 §§ 3(A)(3), 3(A)(4)). This act is clearly a form of "back-end tender offer
regulation." Id. at 30.
219. Note, Missouri Takeover Regulation: Solving the Shareholder Coordination
Problem, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 491, 501-02 (1985).
220. Booth, supra note 28, at 1179; Pinto, supra note 198, at 499.
221. J. BRooKs, supra note 3, at 261; Note, supra note 209, at 236.
222. See Danilow & Bentley, 20 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 13, 18 (1987).
223. Veasey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Is-
sues, Strategies, and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 871 (1988); Goldman, Delaware
Anti-Takeover Legislation is Needed, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 31, col. 1.
224. The front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer is the Sean Penn of takeover
tactics.
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loaded, two-tiered tender offers has had a significant impact on
state tender offer legislation. However, two-tiered bids are not the
only impetus. State interest, legitimate or not, in protecting local
target companies from sharks in other states is a major motivating
force behind many state tender offer laws.221 5 The distasteful sce-
nario of target companies making a trip to the state legislature as
their first defensive tactic has occurred altogether too often. 226
Professor Roberta Romano has developed a theory based on
political power structures to explain why state tender offer laws
are passed. Using Connecticut as her primary example, she ex-
plained how the political influence of a major local corporation, in
this case Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company, can over-
ride potential conflicting interests. 27 Although Professor Ro-
mano's theories have much validity, in my opinion politicians re-
quire a rationale for legislation other than pressure from major
corporations, a rationale that will appeal to the voters' sense of
fairness. The bogey man in the guise of the front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer provides such a rationale. As Romano noted,
fair price statutes are the most popular form of second generation
statute because they are easy to justify in terms of the best inter-
ests of all shareholders. "Recognition of a need for equal treat-
ment among shareholders makes a fair price statute appealing; the
concern for preventing allegedly coercive tenders is ammunition
for refuting the contention that [tender offer] legislation is princi-
pally a device to entrench poorly performing managers by discour-
aging takeovers. 228 In a similar manner, the other major types of
225. See Danilow & Bentley, supra note 222, at 19 ("The New York statute enables
target boards to hinder or block many (although not all) nationwide tender offers - in-
cluding offers by bidders who plan to effect a second-step merger ....").
226. See, e.g., White, Washington State Legislative Leaders Meet with Boeing, Wall
St. J., July 30, 1987, at 12, col. I ("Boeing Co., anticipating a possible unfriendly takeover
bid from investor T. Boone Pickens, met with leaders of the Washington State Legislature
to discuss modifications of the state's existing anti-takeover laws."); Miller, How Indiana
Shielded a Firm and Changed the Takeover Business, Wall St. J., July 1, 1987, at 1, col.
6 (the Chairman of Arvin Industries immediately contacted state senate leaders after being
threatened with a tender offer and effectuated "emergency legislation," resulting in Indi-
ana's second anti-takeover statute within two months); Kilman & Schwadel, Minnesota
Passes Anti-Takeover Bill Sought to Thwart Dayton Hudson Suitor, Wall St. J., June 26,
1987, at 6, col. 1 ("The Minnesota Legislature passed a strong anti-takeover bill aimed at
thwarting Dart Group Corp.'s interest in acquiring Dayton Hudson Corp., the big Minne-
apolis-based retailer.").
227. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I 11,
122-41 (1987).
228. Id. at 119.
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second generation state takeover statutes no doubt owe some of
the support necessary for their passage to the deterrent effect
which they have on the alleged coercion and inequity generated by
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers. 29
2. Supreme Court Validation
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., a cloud hung over all the second generation statutes, and
some were struck down in the lower federal courts.2 30 Most legal
scholars were predicting a similar fate for second generation stat-
utes2 31 in the Supreme Court. Therefore, when the issue came
before the Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,2 32
the result was surprising.
CTS addressed the validity of the Indiana Control Share Ac-
quisition Act2"3 (a voting rights statute in my system of categori-
229. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
230. E.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1986)(Indiana's second generation statute violated the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses
and was preempted by the Williams Act.), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987);
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986)(concluding that Ohio
Rev. Stat. § 1701.831 is unconstitutional); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985)(Minnesota's statute "is a different statute from the
Illinois Act under consideration in Edgar v. MITE Corp., yet it suffers from the same
constitutional infirmities.").
231. E.g., Siamas, Can States Curb Tender Offers?, 73 A.B-A. J. 80, 85 (1987)(pre-
dicting that the Supreme Court might invalidate the Indiana law, leaving "domestic corpo-
rations to take their takeover concerns to Congress, not their state legislatures").
232. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). See generally Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the
Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 101 HARv. L. REV. 96 (1987)(Langevoort compares the impact and significance
of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause and preemption analysis in CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of America, with their decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.); Regan, Siamese
Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865 (1987) (addresses
the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis); Tannon & Stewart, Did the
Indiana Decision Buoy Takeover Regulation?, MERGERS & AcQuisiTioNs, Sept.-Oct.
1987, at 22, 43 ("In upholding Indiana's control share acquisition law, the United States
Supreme Court apparently strengthened the power of states to regulate takeovers if share-
holders are given a voice in the process. Bolder legislative initiatives could lead to judicial
rejection, which was the fate of most earlier statutes."); Brown, Paley & Richman, Does
CTS Mean New Life for State Takeover Statutes?, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1987, at 21, col. 2
("The CTS ruling appears to legitimate various types of 'second' and 'third' generation
statutes enacted in the wake of MITE that (a) apply only to corporations incorporated in
the regulating state and that have other substantial contracts with the state. . . and (b) do
not bar transactions in shares but regulate corporate governance ....").
233. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1986).
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zation). The district court2 4 and the Seventh Circuit2 35 followed
what they believed to be the MITE line of reasoning and invali-
dated the statute on both Commerce Clause and Supremacy
Clause grounds.
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, emphasized
that tender offers are beneficial and that "[f]or the sake of trivial
or even negative benefits to its residents Indiana is depriving non-
residents of the valued opportunity to accept tender offers from
other nonresidents. ' ' 23 1 This "market approach" was consistent
with Justice White's plurality opinion in MITE, which carried the
implicit message that tender offers are "good" and any impedi-
ments to them are "bad. ' 237 In CTS, however, Justice White
found himself in the minority. Justice Powell's majority opinion
carries a very different tone than that of the MITE decision.
a. Supremacy Clause Analysis
Three main issues were discussed in the Court's Supremacy
Clause analysis. First, the Court concluded that Congress had not
explicitly pre-empted state regulation of tender offers.238 Secondly,
the Court held that it was possible to simultaneously comply with
both the Williams Act and the Indiana Act. 39 The third and key
issue, however, was whether the Indiana Act frustrated the main
purpose of the Williams Act,240 which is shareholder protection. 4 a
MITE had invalidated an Illinois takeover law, in part, because it
favored target management and operated to defeat legitimate
tender offers to the detriment of target shareholders.242 By con-
trast, Powell noted, the Indiana law was not unduly pro-manage-
234. 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I11.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.
Ct. 1637 (1987).
235. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
236. Id. at 264.
237. Prentice, supra note 197, at 20.
238. 107 S. Ct. at 1644.
239. Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
43 (1963)).
240. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Ray v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
241. There is a debate over whether creating a "level playing field," which favors
neither management nor takeover bidder, was a Williams Act goal of independent signifi-
cance or whether the level playing field was simply a means to the Act's primary
goal--shareholder protection. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977) indicated
that both goals were important. MITE intimated the same thing, though CTS seems to
subordinate the "neutrality" goal.
242. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
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ment; instead, it "protects the independent shareholder against
both of the contending parties. ' 243 By placing the investors on an
"equal footing" with the bidder,244 it furthered the basic purpose
of the Williams Act. Target shareholders who must act indepen-
dently, Powell reasoned, are often at a disadvantage when facing
the coercive aspects of a tender offer. By allowing shareholders to
vote as a group,245 the Indiana Act helped to provide protection.
To illustrate his point, Powell used the two-tiered tender offer
as an example:
If, for example, shareholders believe that a successful tender of-
fer will be followed by a purchase of nontendering shares at a
depressed price, individual shareholders may tender their shares
- even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best
interest - to protect themselves from being forced to sell their
shares at a depressed price. As the SEC explains: "The alterna-
tive of not accepting the tender offer is virtual assurance that, if
the offer is successful, the shares will have to be sold in the
lower priced, second step . . . ." In such a situation under the
Indiana Act, the shareholders as a group, acting in the corpora-
tions' best interest, could reject the offer, although individual
shareholders might be inclined to accept it. The desire of the
Indiana Legislature to protect shareholders of Indiana corpora-
tions from this type of coercive offer does not conflict with the
Williams Act. Rather, it furthers the federal policy of investor
protection.2
41
Justice Powell distinguished the Court's decision in MITE on
other grounds as well. The Indiana Act did not have the lengthy
hold-open requirement and the state approval requirement which
were at issue in MITE. 47 He also pointed out how difficult it
would be to strike down the Indiana law and yet preserve tradi-
tional state dominion over internal corporate matters.248 Many
state provisions of unquestioned validity, such as the requirement
of shareholder approval for mergers and the provisions for cumu-
243. 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
244. Id. at 1645-46 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977),
quoting, in turn, the Senate Report accompanying the Williams Act, S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967)).
245. 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
246. Id. (quoting Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase
Programs, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,637 (June 21, 1984)).
247. Id. at 1647.
248. Id. at 1647-48.
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lative voting, deter tender offers to some extent.249
b. Commerce Clause Analysis
Justice Powell absolved the Indiana Act of the allegation that
it violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against inter-
state commerce. He pointed out that the Act regulated all tender
offers for corporations formed in Indiana, whether those offers
originated in-state or out-of-state.250 Unlike the Illinois Act in
MITE and most first generation takeover laws, the Indiana Act
limited its regulation to tender offers for corporations formed in
Indiana, thereby eliminating the risk of subjecting bidders to in-
consistent state regulation.2 1
Justice Powell then addressed the issue which the Seventh
Circuit had found to be determinative - whether the Indiana Act
might hinder the successful completion of tender offers. Justice
Powell rejected the implication of MITE that tender offers have a
beneficial effect and should not be impeded. He noted that every
state has enacted regulations that to some extent might hinder
tender offers. For example, regulations prescribing the rights and
powers of shareholders to acquire and vote shares can have this
effect. He reiterated that the Indiana Act protects shareholders by
allowing them to vote collectively.252 Powell rejected the claim
that tender offers should generally be favored because they en-
hance the efficient allocation of capital assets and again noted the
coercive effect of two-tiered tender offers.
Indiana's concern with tender offers is not groundless. Indeed,
the potentially coercive aspects of tender offers have been recog-
nized by the Securities and Exchange Commission. . . and by a
number of scholarly commentators . . . . The Constitution does
not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic
theory . . . . In our view, the possibility of coercion in some
takeover bids offers additional justification for Indiana's decision
to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders.253
249. Id. at 1647-48, 1650.
250. Id. at 1648-49.
251. Id. at 1649.
252. Id. at 1650-51.
253. Id. at 1651 (citing Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer
Purchase Programs, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,637 at 86,916 (June 21, 1984)). See also Bradley & Rosenzweig,
Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1377, 1412-13 (1986); Lowenstein, Prun-
ing Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249,
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Thus, the perceived coercive nature of front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers played a critical role in the Supreme Court's
CTS decision, which cast MITE aside and gave state tender offer
regulation a green light. Since CTS was decided, at least fourteen
states have passed tender offer legislation. 54
E. Impact on State Fiduciary Law
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green relegated the issue of whether a majority
shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in a
freeze-out merger to the states.2 55 "Going private" transactions
became especially popular in the early 1970S,251 and Delaware law
naturally became a focal point of litigation by minority sharehold-
ers who were being cashed out in such transactions. Singer v.
Magnavox Co.,2 57 the leading Delaware case, was viewed as a
very pro-minority shareholder decision. The court held that a ma-
jority shareholder could not freeze out minority shareholders with-
out a good "business purpose" for the transaction.2 58 Althiough the
use of front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers appeared incon-
sistent with Singer,259 no court used Singer to invalidate such an
offer.
In 1983, Singer, which had been the leading Delaware case
for approximately six years, was replaced by another case with
implications for front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers -
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.2"' Weinberger eliminated Singer's re-
quirement of-a "business purpose" in order for a majority share-
holder to freeze out minority shareholders through a long-form or
307-09 (1983); Macey & MeChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
YALE U. 13, 20-22 (1985).
254. See supra note 197.
255. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
256. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REv. 518 (1984).
257. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
258. Id. at 980.
259. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
260. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See generally Prickett & Hanrahan, Weinberger v.
UOP: Delaware's Effort to Preserve a Level Playing Field for Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 59 (1983); Weiss, The Law of Take-Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ush-
ers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245 (1983); Richards & Williams, Compliance with
Delaware Law Problems in Parent-Subsidiary Acquisitions, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 40,
col. 2; Mallenbaum, Helping a Company "Go Private," Nat'l L.J., Jan. 6, 1984, at 15, col.
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short-form merger. 261 Although this aspect of the decision ap-
peared to smooth the way for the use of "back door" mergers,
other portions of the opinion set up new barriers. The court re-
placed the "Delaware block" method26 2 of calculating the "fair
price" of minority shares with a comprehensive approach more
favorable to minority shareholders. The court stressed that deter-
mination of whether the minority was being offered a "[f] air price
obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors involving
the value of a company . . . . [The] more liberal approach must
include proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court,"263 subject to interpretation under
the Delaware appraisal statute.6 4
This new, more liberal approach for calculating the "fair
price" aspect of the "entire fairness" requirement for freezeout
mergers had obvious implications for the use of front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers. It created a stronger position for share-
holders who had not tendered, yet wished to challenge the price
they were being offered in the second-step cash-out merger. Com-
mentators asked whether the higher front-end tender offer price
should be taken into account in valuing the shares being pur-
chased in the second-step cash-out merger. 65
The Singer and Weinberger line of cases echoed the same
concerns about front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers which
Brudney and Chirelstein had expressed in 1974.266 Some scholars
argue that the Weinberger holding, coupled with the SEC's pro-
mulgation of Rule 14d-8, accounts for the decline in the use of
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers between 1982 and
261. 457 A.2d at 715.
262. Under the Delaware Block method of calculating share value, fair value is de-
termined by weighing a share's market value, asset value, dividend value, and earning
value. See Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (1965);
Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971); Blasingame v. American
Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983).
263. 457 A.2d at 713.
264. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1987).
265. E.g., Chazen, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Implications for Planning Corporate
Transactions, in II FIFTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 265, 279
(1983)("There is nothing in UOP which suggests that judicial review of [front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers] would be any less rigorous than in a going private transaction,
except that if the back-end price is announced at the time of the tender offer the courts
may view the two steps as a unitary transaction."); Mirvis, supra note 83.
266. Booth, supra note 256, at 518 n.5.
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1984.267 This conclusion has some validity, perhaps, but it proba-
bly overstates the case because it fails to account for the passage
of state antitakeover legislation. States would not have felt obliged
to pass as many antitakeover laws aimed specifically at front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offers if the Weinberger holding had
truly offered full protection for non-tendering shareholders
trapped in the back-end merger. In spite of the more liberal ap-
praisal formula it sets forth, Weinberger is of little avail to share-
holders given the cumbersome, expensive, and "last resort" nature
of appraisal proceedings in general.268 Although appraisal pro-
ceedings are not a shareholder's exclusive remedy if he can prove
exceptional circumstances such as fraud, misrepresentation, self-
dealing, or deliberate waste of corporate assets,2 69 courts do not
often find such circumstances. Therefore, the inadequate appraisal
proceedings remain the shareholder's main remedy.270
More importantly, no court has applied Weinberger to invali-
date a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer. Joseph v. Shell
Oil Co. 271 is the only case which has even considered this issue.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company attempted to cash-out the mi-
nority shareholders of Shell Oil. Royal Dutch had controlled a
majority of Shell shares for over sixty years when it decided to
purchase the remaining shares.27 2 Rather than act through the
long-form Delaware merger statute, Royal Dutch made a cash
tender offer of fifty-eight dollars per share for the remaining Shell
shares. 27 '3 The bid was structured in order to coerce minority
shareholders into tendering.7 4 Royal Dutch expressly stated that
it would not purchase any untendered shares through another
tender offer or a merger for a price higher than fifty-eight dollars
for at least eighteen months 2 75 Thus, unless a shareholder ten-
267. Note, supra note 209, at 224-25 n.130.
268. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Cor-
porate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969)(calling appraisal "remedy of
desperation"); Lipton, supra note 32, at 18; Strauch, Regulating Two-Tier Tender Offers:
A Compromise Proposal with Negligible Disruption, 22 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 41, 63
(1986).
269. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
270. R. FERRARA, M. BROWN & J. HALL, supra note 107, at 127.
271. 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984).
272. Id. at 338-39.
273. Id. at 340.
274. Herzel & Finkelstein, Fairness: Majority vs. Minority, Nat'l L.J., July 16,
1984, at 15, col. 1.
275. 482 A.2d at 340.
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dered, he would have to wait at least eighteen months before get-
ting the same price. Given the time value of money, this offer was
clearly the equivalent of a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offer.
The court, however, did not even address the coercive nature
of the offer. Instead, it held that a majority shareholder does not
generally have a fiduciary duty to offer the minority a fair price in
a tender offer.276 However, because the tendering shareholders in
Joseph were unlikely to discover the unfairness of the tender price
due to the inadequate disclosures accompanying the bid, the court
held that the offer was invalid. Because it uses a different line
of reasoning, this case illustrates that Weinberger has had only a
slight impact, if any, on two-tiered bids.
III. REASONS FOR DECLINE AS AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON
In 1982, 20% of all tender offers were front-end loaded, two-
tiered offers. By 1985 through 1986 its use as an offensive weapon
had declined to 3 %, and by 1987 it had disappeared altogether.278
What caused this decline? The demise of the front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offer can be traced to the various
changes in the law discussed in the preceding sections of this pa-
per: new SEC rules,279 new state antitakeover laws, 28 0 new corpo-
rate "shark repellents," 281 and discretion granted under the busi-
ness judgment rule for directors to fight allegedly coercive
offensive maneuvers with extreme defensive tactics. 2  Addition-
ally, the rise in junk bond financing made it easier to finance
"any-and-all" offers, thus decreasing the motivation for use of
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers.283
IV. USE AS A DEFENSIVE TACTIC
Today the dominant use of front-end loaded, two-tiered
276. Id. at 341.
277. Id.
278. Grundfest, supra note 41, at 26, col. 4 & at 27, col. 1. For an interesting com-
parison, see also Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 171
(1988)(showing coercive nature of management-sponsored, dual-class exchange offers
which shareholders often must accept although their economic interests are injured).
279. See supra note 98, 105, 109, 113-14 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 197-254 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 123-34 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 155-94 and accompanying text.
283. Grundfest, supra note 41, at 27, col. 1; Sommer, supra note 122, at 24, col. 1.
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tender offers is defensive.18" It may take the form of a white
knight's competing offer or of a target's defensive self-tender of-
fer."85 There has been such a complete reversal in use of the tactic
that SEC Commissioner Grundfest wrote an article expressing
concern about the coercive effects of a defensive front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offer on shareholders.28 6 Use of a defensive
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer can, however, spark an
offensive use of the same weapon, as a recent case illustrates.
Campeau/Macy's/Federated
In the spring of 1988, one of the more hard-fought tender
offer battles of recent years was played out.287 It involved two
front-end loaded, two-tiered offers. The target was Federated De-
partment Stores, which had a poison pill in place. 88 On January
25, 1988, Campeau, through its wholly-owned subsidiary CRTF,
made a hostile "any-and-all" cash offer for Federated shares at
$47 per share.2 9 At the same time, CRTF filed suit seeking to
enjoin Federated from invoking the poison pill. As jockeying for
position occurred, CRTF gradually raised its "any-and-all" cash
bid to $68 per share.29°
For a time it appeared that CRTF would reach a negotiated
agreement with Federated's management, but at the eleventh hour
R.H. Macy & Co. intervened with a white knight front-end
284. Grundfest, supra note 41, at 27, col. 1.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 26, col. 2-4. Although Commissioner Grundfest was not convinced that
any form of tender offer is truly coercive, he argued that if front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offers are coercive when used offensively, they must be equally coercive when used
defensively.
Lipton, supra note 38, at 20 n.90, disagrees, noting that target management, unlike
the hostile bidder, is constrained by a fiduciary duty owed to the target shareholders. A few
courts have held such an offer to be impermissibly coercive. See Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1986)(target board did not fulfill its role as auctioneer
because it improperly favored management's front-end loaded, two-tiered, self-tender offer
over hostile bidder's any-and-all bid); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519
A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986). Interestingly, the front-end loaded, two-tiered self-tender
offer in Anderson, Clayton was deemed not only "coercive," but also not "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed," because the hostile offer it responded to was explicitly held to
be non-coercive since it was an any-and-all cash offer for $56/share which promised a
second-stage merger for any untendered shares, also at $56/share cash. Id. at 112-13.
287. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,680 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 1988).
288. Id. at 98,115.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 98,116.
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loaded, two-tiered bid for Federated. The front-end offer was
$73.80 cash for 80% of Federated. In exchange for the final 20%
of Federated, Macy offered a 40% interest in the combined
Macy/Federated entity.2 91 Macy soon raised its front-end bid to
$74.50 per share. According to Federated's investment bankers,
the blended value of the Macy bid was $70 to $80 per share.292
The persistent CRTF responded with its own front-end
loaded, two-tiered bid. It was an all-cash bid, offering $75 per
share for 80 % of Federated shares and promising $40 per share in
the back-end merger, for a blended value of $68 per share."9 '
Macy increased the pressure by raising its front-end tender offer
price to $77.35 per share and reducing its offer for the back-end
merger to 36 %, rather than 40 %, of the post-merger entity.2 94 As
befits a white knight, Macy was granted many benefits by Feder-
ated's management, including the following promises if its bid
failed: (1) a breakup fee of up to $45 million for expenses, (2) a
topping fee of 25 % of consideration received in excess of $77.35
per share from another acquiror, and (3) a lockup of two divisions
of Federated which would be sold to Macy's at market value.295
The case was in this posture when, on March 18, 1988, Judge
Sand of the Southern District of New York ruled on CRTF's
challenge to the Federated poison pill in CRTF Corporation v.
Federated Department Stores. He ruled that a poison pill, while
questionable, is valid if used to promote an auction or to protect a
target from coercive offers.
CRTF claims that its two-tiered offer is not intended to be coer-
cive but was required in order to make the CRTF offer as com-
parable as possible to the Macy's offer. It asserts that the dan-
ger was that investors would tender into a $74.50 offer for 80
percent of the shares rather than into a $68 offer for 100 percent
of the shares, even if the latter was overall a more beneficial
offer.
. . . It is the opinion of the court that regardless of the
motivation, the principal consequence of the change to a two-
tiered, front-end loaded, all-cash offer is to coerce shareholders
into tender into [sic] the first stage offer at.$75 to avoid being
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 98,117.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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left with shares worth only $44 in a subsequent merger.
[I]f we were to enjoin Federated from the exercise of
the [poison pill], . . . we would be making it vulnerable to a
street sweep; to this and other coercive, two-tiered, front-end
loaded tender offers; to a decrease in existing offers; and possibly
to other dangers."'
CRTF responded to the ruling by simply increasing the pres-
sure of its offer. It raised its front-end tender offer price from $75
per share to $82 per share, while at the same time lowering its
back-end merger price from $44 per share to $37 per share.2 97
Aware of the appearance of such tactics, Robert Campeau, Chief
Executive Officer of CRTF's parent corporation, placed an open
letter to the Federated board in the Wall Street Journal stating
that he opposed two-tiered offers, but felt that he had no choice,
given the structure of the Macy bid.2 98 The bloody battle ended
when CRTF and Macy agreed that CRTF would buy Federated
and then sell $1.1 billion of prime Federated assets to Macy.299
V. ASSESSMENT OF FRONT-END LOADED, Two-TIERED TENDER
OFFERS
Does the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer deserve its
reputation as the most infamous of takeover tactics? Does its exis-
tence justify the various changes in tender offer law that it has
caused? This Article's tentative answer is yes. This answer will be
explained by examining two facets of the front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offer: coerciveness and unfairness.
296. Id. at 98,120-21 (emphasis added).
297. Burrough, Campeau Raises Federated Bid To $6.54 Billion, Wall St. J., Mar.
23, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
298. Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 31. In part, Campeau said:
I do not like a two-tier offer. That's playing the arbitrageur game.
Monday, Macy's played this game again. However, I want you and the world to
know that this is not my game-that I am responding to Federated and Macy's
game-and I think it should be stopped. We want to appeal to your sense of
justice. I would like an opportunity to sit down with you immediately to con-
clude a merger agreement. Under such agreement, we would be prepared and
able to pay $68 a share across the board, if you prefer, not favoring anyone, and
we would be able to pay this promptly. However, since you have endorsed a two-
tier offer, our offer remains two-tier.
Id.
299. Betting the Store: Campeau at Last Gets Federated - Now Can He Make A
Go Of It?, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
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A. Coercive Effect
Most commentators have concluded that front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers are unduly coercive in their effect on tar-
get shareholders,300 and virtually all courts addressing the matter
have agreed.301 Professor Ronald Gilson has intimated that only
two-tiered tender offers which are front-end loaded are coercive.
He reasoned that in the case of most partial bids, if a second step
merger follows then the bidder almost always pays more than the
original market price, and if no merger follows then there is a
fiduciary duty placed upon the new majority owner that will pro-
tect the minority shareholders' interests. 02 However, Gilson's ar-
gument ignores the fact that even though the second-step price
may exceed the pre-tender offer market price, it may be below the
first-step tender offer price. In this scenario, pressure is still placed
on the shareholders to tender.
Perhaps the real issue is whether a lost chance to profit con-
stitutes a loss. The shareholder will think that he has suffered a
loss whenever the market price of the target has fallen below the
tender offer price whether or not there is a back-end merger. 33 If
securities are offered in the back end, what appears to be an equal
300. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHARE-
HOLDERS § 5:26(A) (2d ed. 1986); DeMott, supra note 202, at 991; Harrington, If It Ain't
Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34
SYRACUSE L. REV. 977, 1004 (1983); Macey & McChesney, supra note 253, at 20; Note,
supra note 134, at 1966; Note, Virginia's Affiliating Transactions Article: The Death of
Two-Tiered Takeovers in Virginia?, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1103, 1106 n.16 (1987);
Marinaccio, Bidder, Target Balance Ought to Be Re-Evaluated, Legal Times, Mar. 25,
1985, at 20, col. 1; Nathan, supra note 36, at 31, col. 1; Fleischer, Sun Shines on Bidders
in Corporate Takeover World, Legal Times, Jan. 25, 1982, at 15, col. 1. But see Bradley,
Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between
Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 30 (1988)("two-tier,
front-end loaded tender offers are not coercive and do not impede the (optimal) allocation
of the target resources").
301. Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill.
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,680 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 1988); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F.
Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1332,
1342 (Del. 1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985); Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.12 (Del. 1985); Facet Enter., Inc. v.
The Prospect Group, Inc., Civ. No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988); AC Acquisitions v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113 (Del. Ch. 1986)(self tender).
302. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 861 (1981).
303. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1713 (1985).
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bid may become front-end loaded because of the impact of market
forces on the value of the securities. °4
Gilson's second argument, that minority shareholders are pro-
tected by the fiduciary duty owed them by the new majority own-
ers, ignores the perils of being a minority shareholder under a new
regime. This protection may prove illusory. The new owner may
be incompetent or the minority shareholder may have to rely on
the less than desirable derivative lawsuit for protection. 05
In defense of the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer,
one can argue that any type of tender offer is coercive to an ex-
tent.306 As one court has noted, "pressure on stockholders to de-
cide whether to sell is the primary characteristic of a tender of-
fer." 307 Even an "any-and-all" bid is somewhat coercive if there is
no promise that those who do not tender will receive at least the
same price at a later date.308
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein argue that the front-end
loaded, two-tiered tender offer was designed to be and is more
coercive than other types of tender offers.
Given the inability of [a target's] dispersed stockholders to com-
304. Fogelson & Kapp, supra note 40, at 656.
305. One problem is that careless mismanagement as well as self-dealing may be
difficult to detect. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Rem-
edy, 12 DEL J. CORP. L. 911, 918-19 (1987). Another problem is the limited effectiveness
of derivative suits. See Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 676 n.134 (1984). See also Dent, The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 109 (1980)(increased use of special litigation committees limits useful-
ness of derivative litigation); Deutsch, Regulation and the United States Corporation: An
Alternative to Law-and-Economics, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1463, 1481-82 (1988)(derivative
suits have limited usefulness as monitor of directors in takeover phenomenon).
306. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 305, at 679 ("Any offer to purchase stock that
involves payment of a premium over the market price results in pressure on shareholders to
tender their shares."); Note, supra note 134, at 1966 ("Any tender offer undeniably con-
tains an element of coercion.").
307. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 302 (D. Del. 1981). See also
BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., [1988 Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,730 (D.
Del. 1988)(even an all-cash offer can be a "threat" to the target shareholders for Unocal
purposes); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1981)("Any tender offer
is likely to be coercive to some degree.").
308. According to Professor Lowenstein, there is pressure in any bid because: (1) the
shareholder may never see as high a price again, (2) he may receive as high a price only
after a delay, or (3) he may see his or her liquidity impaired for a time. Lowenstein, supra
note 253, at 267.
Bebchuk, supra note 305, at 924-25 argues that the prisoner's dilemma forces share-
holders to tender during any offer in which they attach a sufficiently significant chance of
success to the bid, no matter how inadequate they think it is.
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municate with one another during the tender, the act of offering
a higher price on tender than would be paid on merger would
have a "whipsaw" effect on [the target's] stockholders. Individ-
ual stockholders would find it difficult or impossible to refuse a
tender price of $40 when they are also made aware that if the
tender succeeds, the remaining shares will be merged out at $30.
In effect, an announced disparity between the tender and the
merger figure would deprive [the target's] stockholders of their
ability to make an unforced, independent judgment on whether
an average of $35 per share is an acceptable overall price for the
assets of the firm. Hence, although the presence of a concealed
disparity must be regarded as unfair, the presence of an an-
nounced differential is plainly coercive."09
The effect of front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers is to
"stampede" target shareholders into a decision to tender."' x The
"whipsaw" effect is created by the "prisoner's dilemma." ' Al-
though every shareholder may believe that the bid is too low and
the wiser course would be to hold out for a higher bid, an inability
to act cooperatively forces each shareholder to tender out of fear
that if he does not tender, his fellow shareholders will, leaving him
stuck with the lower back-end merger price.312 The more extreme
the differential between the front-end tender offer price and the
back-end merger price, the greater the coercive effect. 13
The logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" argument is difficult to
challenge. But the argument has been challenged on the basis of
several statistical studies. A study by Comment and Jarrell found
that two-tiered bids are not coercive, because more persons tender
in an "any-and-all" bid (74.7 %) than in a two-tiered bid
309. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 55, at 337. See also Brudney & Chirelstein,
A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
310. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 305, at 677, 679; Oesterle, Target Managers as
Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity
Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 61-63 (1985); Note, supra note 46, at 409.
311. See supra note 37. See also Booth, supra note 256, at 551 n.174; Carney,
Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case
Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341, 349 n.39, 351 n.47, 366;
Herzel & Finkelstein, supra note 274, at 15, col. 1.
312. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Bids, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028,
1040 (1982)(noting that the stampede effect may be minimized if large accumulations of
shares are held by institutional investors or if a competing bid arises); Finkelstein, supra
note 107, at 293; Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 301 (1986)(tendering "dominates" non-tendering because opti-
mal shareholder response cannot be obtained due to inability to coordinate action); Lipton,
supra note 38, at 19; Oesterle, supra note 310, at 60-64;
313. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 253 at 1418.
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(61.8%), while an even lower percentage (35.5%) tender in a
pure partial bid.31 These figures, however, immediately indicate
that a two-tiered, front-end loaded offer puts substantially more
pressure on target shareholders than does a pure partial bid. Pro-
fessor Oesterle has pointed out that these statistics also ignore the
fact that two-tiered offers tend to be made for the larger compa-
nies with more dispersed ownership, where it is natural that the
percentage of shares tendered would be lower.315
Another study argues that front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offers are not coercive because they are almost always beaten by
"any-and-all" bids with a higher overall value.316 Although this is
somewhat comforting, Oesterle points out that it begs the question
by failing to examine what target management did to cause the
result.317 For example, an "any-and-all" white knight bid with en-
dorsements from target management and the support of lock-up
options would, naturally, prevail over a hostile front-end loaded
bid in most cases. 3 8
These points also respond to the claim that front-end loaded,
two-tiered tender offers are not coercive because they normally
succeed only if they are ultimately negotiated with target manage-
ment.31 9 The act of negotiation carries no unusual significance
given the fact that eighty percent of all successful tender offers
are negotiated. 20 In addition, negotiation may have come about
because management saw the handwriting on the wall and was
314. Comment & Jarrell, Two-Tier Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of the Free-
Riding Shareholders, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 301-02 (1987). Note that an earlier, fuller
version of this paper was discussed in Osterle, supra note 131.
315. Oesterle, supra note 131, at 127 n.46.
316. Two-Tier Tender Offer and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs - Advance
Notice of Possible Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 83,367, at 1119 (June 21, 1984) [hereinafter SEC
Request].
317. Oesterle, supra note 131, at 127-28 n.46.
318. Indeed, a major thrust of the Comment & Jarrell article is that "[tihe bargain-
ing power of target management apparent in these results suggests that their action is one
reason for the absence, on average, of an adverse shareholder wealth effect from front-end
takeovers." Comment & Jarrell, supra note 314, at 285. Thus, while some would cite these
statistics in order to claim that front-end loaded bids are not coercive and, therefore, share-
holders do not need any protection, these statistics in fact may show just the opposite. As
Oesterle points out, the numbers support the conclusions that "target boards negotiate bet-
ter offers in response to two-tier tender offers than their shareholders would otherwise re-
ceive." Oesterle, supra note 131, at 122 n.26.
319. Comment & Jarrell, supra note 314, at 302-03.
320. Office of the Chief Economist, supra note 35, at 368.
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willing to go to the table. 2'
These statistical arguments are interesting; however, they are
misleading to some degree. I believe that they minimize the "coer-
cion differential" between front-end loaded, two-tiered tender of-
fers and other types of offers, but they do not eliminate it. The
intuitive appeal of the prisoner's dilemma argument is too strong.
Furthermore, these arguments overlook the fact that when front-
end loaded, two-tiered tender offers succeed, they do so by paying
less of a premium, on average, than it takes to prevail in an "any-
and-all" bid. 22
In assessing the coercive nature of two-tiered offers, one must
finally consider the point of view of the participants in the take-
over game. For example, Robert Campeau believed that although
his "any-and-all" offer had a higher blended value, it could not
defeat a front-end loaded, two-tiered offer, and he thus restruc-
tured his bid. 2' Target managements now gear a large number of
their defensive tactics toward providing equal treatment between
shareholders in the back-end and those in the front.
B. Unfairness
Brudney and Chirelstein believe that front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers are unfair because shareholders in the back-
end do not receive as much compensation as those who tender in
the front-end. 24 They point out that a shareholder can vote
321. Also, there is no way for studies to consider the role of target management in
unnegotiated transactions. Because the final takeover was not negotiated does not mean
that target management, through defensive tactics, did not have a role to play in shaping
the final premium offered.
322. SEC Request, supra note 316, at 1123. However, Comment & Jarrell, supra
note 314, at 298, found no statistically significant difference between blended premiums
paid in any-or-all offers and those paid in two-tiered bids. This can be explained by the
defensive tactics used by target management to obstruct a two-tiered bids, which force an
offeror to pay a higher price. Additionally, Comment and Jarrell admit that:
[Plotential premiums available to target shareholders may, however, exceed our
reported realized premiums. If so, and if any-or-all or negotiated offers can yield
a greater part of the potential premium, target shareholders might realize a net
benefit from a regulation-induced switch to any-or-all or negotiated offers, if not
too many offers are thereby deterred.
Id. at 285. In other words, sharks may use the two-tiered, front-end loaded approach pri-
marily in cases where they fear that they will have to pay a larger than average premium.
By use of modest coercion, they bring the premium down into the "normal" range. This is
plausible, because we know that two-tiered tender offers tend to be used in cases involving
larger targets than any-or-all bids. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
324. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 55, at 336-37. They suggest a requirement
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against a merger, yet still receive the same amount of compensa-
tion as other shareholders if the merger succeeds. The share-
holder, who in effect votes against a front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offer by not tendering, however, will lose the chance to re-
ceive as high a price for his shares as other shareholders do if the
front-end offer is not defeated.32
Easterbrook and Fischel, the leading proponents of unre-
strained tender offers, responded directly to Brudney and Chirel-
stein.326 Rather than claiming that front-end loaded, two-tiered
offers are not coercive, they attempt to justify the price differen-
tial. They believe that an unequal sharing of benefits is necessary
to give incentives to bidders to buy and target shareholders to sell.
They suggest that non-tendering shareholders are "free riders"
who deserve no better than the back-end merger price. They argue
that if an equal price is required on the back-end, tender offers
will fail because shareholders will have no reason to tender. 27
This argument is fallacious, however, because shareholders have
every reason to tender when an attractive premium is offered.3 28
Moreover, two-tiered tender offers that are not loaded on the
front-end commonly succeed.
Others argue that unfairness is an invalid objection because
the blended price of front-end loaded, two-tiered offers will be
higher than the pre-tender offer market price, and usually the
back-end price will be higher as well.3 29 However, one can argue
that from another perspective the back-end price is still unfair,
because it is lower than the price received by front-end tendering
shareholders and it is lower than the price the shareholders might
have bargained for had they not been coerced into tendering by
the prisoner's dilemma.330
that as much be paid in the back-end as in the front-end.
325. Id. For a strong criticism of their position, see Toms, Compensating Sharehold-
ers Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 550-64 (1978)(their propo-
sal would "create market and administration problems, while leaving unresolved many in-
equities of the present standard").
326. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 141, at 1170-74.
327. Id. Oesterle asks how far this argument can be taken. Does it justify, for in-
stance, paying greater dividends to the new shareholders than to the hold-over sharehold-
ers? Oesterle, supra note 312, at 61 n.29.
328. Leebron, supra note 34, at 185 n.115.
329. Coffee, supra note 47, at 1169; Gilson, supra note 302, at 861.
330. This effect is exacerbated by the fact that two-tiered offers tend to discourage
competing bids, impairing the target's chances to "auction" the firm. R. GiLsoN, THE LAW
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONs 853 (1986).
In many instances where shareholders have managed to reject a premium bid, the
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Finally, some argue that equal opportunity is all that is re-
quired, not equal treatment.3 31 In other words, those shareholders
who do not tender have only themselves to blame because they
could have tendered and received the front-end price for a pro-
rated portion of their shares. This argument assumes that the offer
is not oversubscribed. If it is oversubscribed, even shareholders
who sought to tender will be relegated to the back-end for a por-
tion of their shares. This argument also ignores the prisoner's di-
lemma; those shareholders who did not tender might have made a
different decision if they had been able to coordinate their actions
with their fellow shareholders.
The equal opportunity argument also ignores the difference in
resources and abilities between institutional investors and arbi-
trageurs, on the one hand, and individual investors, on the
other.332 Although one can argue that "inattentive" individual in-
vestors should not be protected, 33 even attentive individual inves-
tors can never match the resources of the arbitrageurs and institu-
tional investors who use "runners" to tender at the very last
minute, delaying so that they can take advantage of all possible
information. 34 Furthermore, individual shareholders are not con-
tacted directly during the bid by the contesting parties and never
will be able to sell in a "street sweep" as do the arbitrageurs. 3 5
Individual shareholders are thus inevitably going to be relegated
to the back-end in greater proportion than institutional investors.
CONCLUSION
Front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers are a bit more un-
fair and coercive than other partial offers. However, the negative
backlash has been out of proportion to the true provocation. Per-
ceptions play an important role. One of the first moves by any
decision turned out to be a wise one for they were ultimately able to sell at an even higher
price. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Informa-
tion or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183, 204-05 (1983).
331. Note, supra note 46, at 404.
332. DeMott, supra note 202, at 991; Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Of-
fers: A Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REv. 225, 229 (1984);
Lipton, supra note 38, at 19; Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair
Price Legislation, 43 MD. L. REV. 266, 271 n.22 (1984); Note, Second Step Transactions
in Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Case for State Regulation, 19 GA. L. REv. 343, 353
(1985).
333. E.g., Dennis, supra note 46, at 329.
334. Note, supra note 46, at 409.
335. Romano, supra note 227, at 173.
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participant in a hostile takeover battle is the hiring of a good pub-
lic relations firm to put the right "spin" on press coverage and
perhaps in the halls of Congress and the state legislatures. 6 T.
Boone Pickens realizes the importance of image, which accounts
for much of his work with the United Shareholders Association, a
group formed to advocate both reforms in management practices
and legislation that will facilitate takeovers.337
Those who play the tender offer game should remember that
in American political battles, concerns for equity generally win
out over concerns for efficiency. 38 Victories won with weapons
perceived as coercive and unfair may turn out to be pyrrhic in
nature. If hostile tender offerors had paid less attention to secur-
ing sure victory and more attention to paying a fair price to all
target shareholders, the legal and regulatory environment today
would probably be much more conducive to the takeover process.
Does the overreaction, even if slight, to front-end loaded, two-
tiered tender offers warrant turning back the clock? Should the
SEC repeal some of its rules, particularly Rule 14d-8, which
lengthens the proration period? I do not think that repeal is called
for. The Williams Act is aimed at protecting all target sharehold-
ers, including those who choose not to tender.3 9 The Act's provi-
sions for hold-open requirements, withdrawal rights, and proration
rights all encourage equal treatment of target shareholders.3 ,0
Rules 13e-3, and the "Best Price" and "All Holders" rules also
advance that interest.3 41 If it were decided that the SEC had ex-
ceeded its authority in promulgating these rules, Congress could
step in and make the changes itself. Presently there are bills pend-
336. See H. LAMPERT, TILL DEATH Do US PART 109-11 (1983)(explaining public
relations efforts of combatants in classic Bendix/Martin-Marietta struggle); Lipton, A
Checklist for Defending Against Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 21, col. I (listing
public relations firms as a key part of team to defeat hostile tender offer).
337. See Victor, Pickens' Plan Gets Mixed Reviews From Bar, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 11,
1986, at 9, col. I. Public relations consciousness reportedly accounts for Pickens having
withdrawn his name from the Committee's letterhead after his star had become somewhat
tarnished. See Getschow & Burrough, Pickens, Acting Bitter, Finds Takeover Game Isn't
Much Fun Now, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
338. T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 302 (1984).
339. Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1368 (N.D. Tex.
1979); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227,
241-42 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
340. S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1124 (D. Mass. 1978).
See generally Note, SEC Takeover Regulation's Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 580 (1987).
341. See supra notes 99, 166 and accompanying text.
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ing before Congress which would increase the "hold-open" period
beyond twenty business days.342 Thus, it appears that Congress
will, if anything, broaden protection.
Only the most extreme advocates of the Chicago School de-
sire the elimination of the SEC rules on efficiency grounds. 43 Af-
ter its passage, the Williams Act did slow tender offers for a
while, but not for long. 344 The trade-off between higher premiums
and more equal opportunity for target shareholders, on one hand,
and optimum efficiency, on the other, 45 seems to represent a sen-
sible policy choice.
Should fair price amendments, poison pills, and other defen-
sive tactics be prohibited? Again, I believe that few persons other
than strict disciples of Easterbrook and Fischel would answer
"yes. '3 48 It would violate the basic tenets of corporation law to say
that target management cannot use defensive tactics to protect
minority shareholders' interests. There is evidence that defensive
342. Smith, Is 20-Day Period the Right Length?, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1987, at 5, col.
1 (several bills pending in Congress to lengthen hold-open period to as long as 45 business
days).
343. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
344. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 119, at 11.
345. If we accept economists' assumptions that market price indicates an increase in
efficiency, and I do not wholly, we must note that premiums rose after passage of the
Williams Act. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN., 371, 396 (1986). This means, functionally, that
before passage of the Williams Act, 71% of the gain in takeovers went to offerors, but
after passage only 47% went to offerors. Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 300, at 28
(bidding firms earned significantly lower returns in the post-Williams Amendment era, al-
though overall synergistic gains remained the same); Leebron, supra note 34, at 179, n.88
(citing, inter alia, Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regula-
tions of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 389, 395 (1980)). It thus appears to be
the implicit policy of the Williams Act to promote fair offers and equal treatment for
target shareholders at the possible expense of the overall level of tender offer activity.
346. Easterbrook and Fischel have argued for passivity on the part of target manag-
ers facing tender offers because defensive tactics reduce the welfare of shareholders. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 140, at 1169; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Is Takeover Defense in Shareholders' Best Interest?, Legal Times, Aug. 10, 1981,
at 42, col. 1.
Professor Bebehuk has argued strongly that Easterbrook and Fischel are simply wrong
in viewing shareholder coercion as a necessary prerequisite to economic efficiency. He
points out that adequate levels of incentive for potential bidders to search for potential
targets exist even absent coercion, and that a "socially excessive level of search" might
result from government policies that deleted concern for shareholder freedom from coer-
cion. Bebchuk, supra note 305, at 938-40. See also Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REv. 23, 30-39 (1982).
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tactics raise the premiums received by all target shareholders 4 7 as
well as protecting minority shareholders in the second-stage. Both
are legitimate concerns of corporate managers.
Of course, defensive tactics may decrease the overall level of
tender offer activity,34 8 but target management cannot be held ac-
countable for this impact. The law imposes no duty on a target
board to dismantle all defenses and hope that the first hostile of-
feror will offer a fair price and equal treatment for all sharehold-
ers.349 A board cannot allow a corporation to be bought too
cheaply on the grounds that from the standpoint of the national
economy, it will "all even out in the end." Studies show that front-
end loaded, two-tiered offers succeed with a lower average pre-
347. One of the most recent studies, conducted by proxy soliciting firm Georgeson &
Co., found that poison pills appeared to raise premiums for target shareholders; the 27
companies with pills received final offers averaging 78.5% above the point at which their
stock had traded six months before the tender offer began versus a figure of 56.7% for 21
targets without a poison pill. Lee, "Poison Pills" Benefit Shareholders by Forcing Raiders
to Pay More for Targets, Study Says, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 55, col. 3. This result
would seem to be consistent with the notion that poison pills deter front-end loaded, two-
tiered offers, which can succeed with a lower average premium, and causes them to be
replaced with any-and-all offers which typically carry a larger premium.
Of course, there is evidence that a price is paid for this higher premium in the form of
less overall takeover activity which may manifest itself in a lower market price for a poten-
tial target corporation's shares. This result would be consistent with the policy choice un-
derlying the Williams Act. However, the evidence is mixed. See Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of Chief Economist, A Study of the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986)(according to a
study of two-day, net-of-market stock returns conducted by the office of Chief Economist,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, adoption of poison pills appears to
decrease market price of adopting companies' stock; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, supra note
345, at 60, 64 (inconclusive evidence does not show that fair price amendments do not
harm target's stock value, but evidence shows poison pills do); Malatesta & Walkling,
Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 347, 374 (1988)(poison pills reduce stockholder wealth by a statistically signifi-
cant amount); Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20
. FIN. ECON. 377, 411 (1988)(on average, poison pills have had only a modest effect on
firm valuation); Lab Reports on Poison Pills, MERGERS & ACQUIsITIONS, Sept.-Oct. 1986,
at 7, 7 (over longer term, price recovers and poison pills have insubstantial effect); Heard
& Pound, Shark Repellents May Fail to Benefit Shareholders, Legal Times, Mar. 25,
1985, at 12, col. 1 (discussing conflicting studies, two finding small negative effect of shark
repellents, one finding positive effect, and one finding no effect on market price of adopting
companies).
348. This conclusion is not clear. The recent wave of adoptions of fair price amend-
ments and poison pills has coincided with a continuing high level of tender offer activity.
See supra note 1.
349. Prentice, supra note 2, at 350 (Courts cannot ask target board "to ignore the
immediate benefit accruing to the target company's particular shareholders on the ground
that in the long run target management action might prove detrimental to the amorphous
'whole' of the shareholders in the country.").
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mium (55.1%) than "any-and-all" offers (63.4 %).350 This dispar-
ity might become much greater if defensive tactics were outlawed.
It is consistent with traditions of corporate law that target man-
agement be authorized to fight to obtain the highest premium pos-
sible for its shareholders.
Federal regulation of poison pills and fair price amendments
would intrude into "an area that has to date been the province of
state corporation law." '51 The proper approach is a careful, case-
by-case examination of the impact that defensive tactics have on
the welfare of target shareholders, which is the approach taken in
Norlin, Unocal, and Revlon.35 2 Federal regulation would be incon-
sistent with the Williams Act and would create the problems dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in CTS. a5 a
Should Congress expressly preempt state tender offer legisla-
tion? Congress has not been inclined to do so thus far. 354 By regu-
lating tender offers, states enact rules which are designed to raise
premiums for the shareholders of corporations within their juris-
dictions.355 Members of the Chicago School and many others be-
lieve that a certain level of "value" is created by most take-
overs.3 5  The states arguably have a legitimate interest in
capturing as much of that value for the shareholders of their cor-
porations as possible. 5'
350. SEC Request, supra note 316, at 1123.
351. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance
Notice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,018, at 88,206 (July 31, 1986).
352. See supra notes 142-65 and accompanying text.
353. One of the consistent themes of the CTS opinion was the well-established he-
gemony of the states over regulation of internal corporate affairs. CTS v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1650 (1987)(Our "beneficial free market system depends at
its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the rarest situations-is organized
under, and governed by the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of
the State of its incorporation.").
354. In virtually every securities law that it has ever passed, including the 1934 Act,
Congress included savings clauses expressly reserving a state role in securities regulation.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78bb(a) (1986). See also, Warren, Reflections on Dual Regu-
lation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REv. 495, 515 (1984).
355. There is evidence that both the Williams Act and corporate shark repellents
have raised premiums for target shareholders, so there is reason to believe that state take-
over regulations might have the same effect.
356. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
357. In support of a state's right to regulate tender offers in the same fashion that it
regulates mergers, Professor Leebron has noted that both mergers and tender offers create
some value and redistribute some value. Leebron, supra note 34, at 156. If one accepts the
argument of those who support free-wheeling tender offers that stock prices are indicative
of efficiency, then one learns that the average gain in mergers is about 20% for target
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The impact of regulation may be to slow down the overall
rate of takeover activity,3 58 but Congress has viewed this as a
price worth paying, and the Supreme Court has agreed in CTS. s59
Those who criticize regulation have not been able to conclusively
prove that tender offers are invariably good for the economy. Pre-
viously, I have indicated that the economic argument, although
very strong, has not been uncontrovertably established.36 0 How-
shareholders and nothing for the bidder. The average return in tender offers is 30% for the
target's shareholders and 4% for the bidder. Since the target is usually much smaller than
the bidder, these tender offer figures indicate that the bidder may bb receiving up to 50%
of the combinative gain. It is reasonable to assume that acquirers will use the tender offer
where the potential for gain is greater and the merger where the potential for gain is less.
It seems legitimate for the states to attempt to regulate the process in order to capture
more of the combinative gain for the shareholders of corporations formed under their laws.
Similarly, if the front-end loaded, two-tiered offer allows hostile bidders to acquire
firms by paying a smaller premium than in other types of bids, it is legitimate for states to
attempt to regulate the process so that a larger portion of the gain from the combination
goes to target shareholders.
As with the adoption of shark repellents and poison pills, there is an ongoing and
inconclusive debate on the effects that a state's adoption of an antitakeover law has on the
market price of corporations formed under its laws. One study found that Ohio's adoption
of such a statute adversely affected the market prices of Ohio corporations. OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIO LEGISLATION AFFECT-
ING TAKEOVERS 17 (1987). On the other hand, another study found that by simply ex-
tending the length of the period of study by one day, all adverse effects disappeared.
Wallman & Ranard, State Takeover Laws Work Well, Legal Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at 22,
col. I. Moreover, an empirical study of a New Jersey takeover law found that companies
subject to it "out performed the market during most of the period studied." 19 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1411 (Sept. 18, 1987).
Another study claimed that passage of the Indiana anti-takeover law approved in CTS
cost shareholders of publicly traded Indiana corporations some $2.65 billion, $1.7 billion of
that loss falling on shareholders of Amoco Corporation. Woodward, How Much Indiana's
Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall St. J., May 5, 1988, at 32, col. 3. The study
was based on one-day abnormal returns on various dates when separate legislative and
judicial actions took place. However, these findings have also been criticized by Amoco's
chief economist, who notes that they are completely inconsistent with the efficient market
hypothesis-arbitrageurs know that bills might be passed long before they are actually
signed and thus incorporate that likelihood into their assessment of the stock's value. To
select single events, therefore, is arbitrary and misleading. Furthermore, the loss to Amoco
shareholders is easily explained by reference to other events occurring in the oil industry.
See Quirin, Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., May 24, 1988, at 39, col. 1.
358. Jarrell & Bradley indicate that traditional antitakeover laws have had little ef-
fect on tender offer activity. See Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 245, at 401-02 ("To de-
scribe the state tender offer laws as 'antitakeover' statutes is not accurate by our evidence,
although the laws do marginally reduce the number of cash offers.").
359. CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct., 1637, 1652 (1987)("[E]ven if
the [Indiana] Act should decrease the number of successful tender offers for Indiana corpo-
rations, this would not offend the Commerce Clause.").
360. Prentice, supra note 197, at 42-49. See also Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The
Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. ECON. PERsP. 69, 80 (1987)("Evidence on 1960s and early
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ever, I am less troubled by its force now that tender offers once
again are made primarily for business reasons rather than for
speculative purposes.361
Front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers need not be out-
lawed. The tactic's super potency has already been neutralized.
Under the present version of the Williams Act, such offers are
clearly legal. It would be difficult to outlaw them, and at the same
time permit other partial offers. Partial offers have a long history,
and the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers has recog-
nized them as useful and necessary.3 62
The most sensible alteration to current law would be to adopt
the British system which allows shareholders to tender their
shares if they are afraid they must do so in order to protect their
position, but simultaneously allows shareholders to vote against
the tender offer if they truly oppose it.3 63 This change would
counteract the coercive effects of all tender offers, not only front-
end loaded, two-tiered bids.
Although explicit front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers
have nearly disappeared as offensive takeover weapons, the tactic
remains worth studying. It is often used defensively, and occasion-
ally it is still used offensively as demonstrated by the battle over
1970s tender offer takeovers reveals no significant long-term improvements in operating
profitability following takeover. Recent takeovers have probably accelerated needed divi-
sional restructuring and led to lower-cost financial structures, but not without risks to the
microeconomy. Whether such takeovers and the more pervasive threat that they will occur
have wide-ranging behavioral consequences remains unknown ...."). Carney has argued
that certain types of two-tier offers may lead to inefficient results. See Carney, Fundamen-
tal Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 69, 109-18.
361. Burrough, Companies Take Over the Takeover Game from Flashy Raiders,
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, at 1, col. 6; Wayne, Takeovers Revert to the Old Mode, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at Dl, col. 3.
362. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 119, at 24-25.
[T]here are many valuable roles for partial offers and partial ownership, includ-
ing: (I) allowing companies to invest in one or more industries with more limited
financial exposure than if ownership were 100%; (2) facilitating technology ex-
change relationships; (3) permitting change of control and reducing manage-
ment entrenchment in large companies; (4) facilitating private direct investment,
such as venture capital; (5) acknowledging the common practice of suppliers of
foreign capital in the United States; and (6) allowing acquirors to get to know a
potential acquiree over time with a view to moving to 100% ownership.
Id.
363. COUNCIL FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVER AND
MERGERS, Rule 27 (5th rev. ed. 1981). This approach has been favored by various Ameri-
can commentators. See Bebchuk, supra note 305, at 931-32; Strauch, supra note 268, at
80.
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Federated Department Stores. 64 Furthermore, takeover expert
Martin Lipton has suggested that the post-Black Monday demise
of junk bonds may revive the use of this tactic.3 65
In conclusion, the coercive and unfair elements inherent in
the offensive use of front-ended loaded, two-tiered tender offers
have probably justified an official response, although the response
is somewhat out of proportion to the provocation.
364. See supra notes 287-99 and accompanying text.
365. Lipton, supra note 38, at 19-20.
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